Authored by Charles Kennedy via OilPrice.com,

• Following ExxonMobil’s massive 2017 oil discovery offshore Guyana, Venezuela has revived and intensified its claim over the Essequibo region.

• A series of cross-border attacks on Guyanese troops, including three on May 15, points to a potential Venezuelan strategy of deniable, Russia-style hybrid warfare.

• The U.S. has warned Venezuela that any attack on Guyana or ExxonMobil would carry serious consequences.

A quiet frontier in South America is rapidly becoming one of the world’s most volatile energy flashpoints.

The disputed region of Essequibo, a sparsely populated expanse administered by Guyana but claimed by Venezuela, has seen tensions simmer for years. But a combination of geopolitical ambition, economic desperation, and energy opportunity is now threatening to tip the standoff into open conflict.

At stake is one of the most valuable stretches of territory in the world—an area that, until recently, few outside the region had heard of.

Essequibo, which comprises nearly two-thirds of Guyana’s landmass, was thrust into the global spotlight after ExxonMobil’s 2017 discovery of the Stabroek Block offshore reserves, estimated at over 11 billion barrels of recoverable oil.

For Guyana the find transformed the country from economic backwater to a regional energy giant almost overnight.

The newfound wealth has also revived Venezuela’s long-standing claim to the region, a grievance dating back to colonial arbitration rulings of the late 19th century. Caracas has never fully relinquished its claim, but it was only after the oil discovery that Venezuela began actively pressing the issue. Since 2022, under President Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela has dramatically escalated its rhetoric and actions—announcing referenda, redrawing maps, and even moving military assets toward the border.

Most alarmingly, Venezuela has begun to mimic the playbook of its closest geopolitical ally—Russia. Much like Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea using unmarked “little green men,” Venezuela appears to be laying the groundwork for a slow, deniable incursion into Essequibo. The playbook combines official rhetoric with irregular warfare tactics, allowing for plausible deniability while steadily undermining Guyana’s control.

The first major signal of this new phase came last year when Maduro’s government held a referendum to “reclaim” Essequibo. Despite international condemnation, the vote passed and led to the formal creation of a new Venezuelan “state” encompassing the territory. Venezuela began offering citizenship to Essequibo’s residents and launched efforts to organize elections in the region.

In March 2025, a Venezuelan naval gunboat intercepted ExxonMobil operations in Guyanese waters, accusing the U.S. oil major of encroaching on Venezuelan territory.

The incident was widely seen as a warning shot—not just to Exxon, but to any foreign investors backing Guyana’s energy future.

But the most ominous sign yet came on May 15, when Guyana’s military reported three armed attacks in a single day on its patrols along the Cuyuni River, a critical stretch of the Guyana–Venezuela border. According to the Guyana Defence Force, unidentified gunmen in civilian clothing opened fire on soldiers in three separate engagements. No casualties were reported, and the Guyanese military responded with what it described as “measured force.”

The attacks were chilling in their timing and coordination. While the assailants were not officially identified, officials in Georgetown and most international observers believe they were Venezuelan operatives or proxies acting on Caracas’s behalf. The region is not known for organized crime or guerrilla activity, and no local insurgency has taken root—at least not yet.

This wasn’t the first time violence erupted in the contested zone. In February, another attack left two Guyanese soldiers critically injured. That incident, too, was blamed on Venezuela-linked forces. 

While the skirmishes may seem minor in isolation, taken together they mark a dangerous pattern of escalation. What’s emerging is a shadow conflict—gray-zone warfare that avoids the threshold of open war while steadily eroding Guyana’s control over Essequibo. The danger, analysts warn, is that this slow-motion campaign could culminate in a de facto annexation, much like Crimea, before the international community has time to respond.

The Guyana Defence Force fields just over 3,000 active personnel with limited air, land, and naval capabilities. Venezuela, by contrast, commands over 100,000 troops, around 200 tanks, dozens of combat aircraft, and a sizable paramilitary force—making any conventional war a one-sided affair.

However, during a visit to Georgetown in March, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio cautioned that any Venezuelan attack on Guyana or ExxonMobil would mark “a very bad day” for Caracas, hinting at serious consequences. Venezuela swiftly condemned the remarks.

The real question now is how the international community, and especially the United States, will respond. ExxonMobil’s deep involvement gives Washington both an interest and a stake in the dispute. But the broader issue goes beyond oil. A successful Venezuelan land grab would further erode the already fragile post-Cold War order. It would also send a message to authoritarian regimes worldwide: territorial revisionism is back—and it works.

Guyana has vowed to defend its sovereignty and is seeking stronger security partnerships.

But unless it receives military support or any other type of real security guarantee from the U.S., Georgetown will struggle to hold the line alone.

For now, Essequibo remains under Guyana’s flag. But the shadow of Caracas is growing—and so is the risk that South America’s next war may erupt in one of its least known, but most strategically vital, regions.