电线松动导致停电,并与弗朗西斯·斯科特·基桥接触。
Loose wire leads to blackout, contact with Francis Scott Key bridge

原始链接: https://www.ntsb.gov:443/news/press-releases/Pages/NR20251118.aspx

## 凯桥坍塌:NTSB报告摘要 国家运输安全委员会(NTSB)确定,一根松动的电线是导致2024年3月巴尔的摩弗朗西斯·斯科特·凯桥坍塌的原因。这根电线由于电线标签带固定不当,引发了电力中断,导致984英尺长的*Dali*号集装船在接近大桥时失去了动力和转向能力。 尽管船员试图恢复控制,*Dali*号仍与17号桥墩相撞,导致大桥的大部分结构坠入河中,不幸造成六名公路工人死亡。NTSB强调了这起事故的可预防性,并赞扬了引航员和相关部门迅速采取行动,从而限制了进一步的伤亡。 调查还揭示了一个关键的脆弱性:1977年建造的凯桥缺乏足够的保护措施,以抵御日益大型船舶的撞击——*Dali*号的尺寸远大于1980年撞击大桥并仅造成轻微损坏的船只。NTSB向包括海岸警卫队和全国桥梁所有者在内的多个组织发出了多项安全建议,敦促他们进行桥梁脆弱性评估并采取预防措施,以避免类似灾难的发生。

## 弗朗西斯·斯科特·基桥倒塌事件摘要 最近巴尔的摩弗朗西斯·斯科特·基桥倒塌是由一根松动的电线引发的,但源于一系列系统性故障,而非单一原因。虽然一个故障的电气连接引发了停电,但调查显示船舶的设计、维护和操作程序存在关键缺陷。 主要问题包括手动而非自动的变压器切换、缺乏关于切换程序的常规培训、单一且非冗余的燃油泵为发电机供油,以及自动发动机关闭而非利用紧急系统。NTSB报告强调了一种“瑞士奶酪模型”的故障,即多个安全措施同时失效。 进一步的担忧包括船舶依赖冲洗泵为发电机供油,绕过标准冗余,以及船舶“黑匣子”数据记录器的问题。专家强调“深度防御”和主动安全措施的重要性,而不仅仅关注单个组件的故障。该事件凸显了航运业中一个更广泛的问题,即优先考虑成本削减而非健全的安全协议和充分的船员培训。桥梁重建估计成本超过50亿美元。
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原文

​​​Blackouts led to loss of steering and propulsion on 984-foot-long vessel

WASHINGTON (Nov. 18, 2025) -- The NTSB said Tuesday that a single loose wire on the 984-foot-long containership Dali caused an electrical blackout that led to the giant vessel veering and contacting the nearby Francis Scott Key Bridge in Baltimore, which then collapsed, killing six highway workers. 

At Tuesday’s public meeting at NTSB headquarters, investigators said the loose wire in the ship’s electrical system caused a breaker to unexpectedly open -- beginning a sequence of events that led to two vessel blackouts and a loss of both propulsion and steering near the 2.37-mile-long Key Bridge on March 26, 2024. Investigators found that wire-label banding prevented the wire from being fully inserted into a terminal block spring-clamp gate, causing an inadequate connection. 

   ​

​Illustration showing how placement of wire-label banding affects the way wires are seated in their terminal blocks. (Source: NTSB)

After the initial blackout, the Dali’s heading began swinging to starboard toward Pier 17 of the Key Bridge. Investigators found that the pilots and the bridge team attempted to change the vessel’s trajectory, but the loss of propulsion so close to the bridge rendered their actions ineffective. A substantial portion of the bridge subsequently collapsed into the river, and portions of the pier, deck and truss spans collapsed onto the vessel’s bow and forwardmost container bays.

A seven-person road maintenance crew and one inspector were on the bridge when the vessel struck. Six of the highway workers died. The NTSB found that the quick actions of the Dali pilots, shoreside dispatchers and the Maryland Transportation Authority to stop bridge traffic prevented greater loss of life.

”Our investigators routinely accomplish the impossible, and this investigation is no different,’ said NTSB Chairwoman Jennifer Homendy. “The Dali, at almost 1,000 feet, is as long as the Eiffel Tower is high, with miles of wiring and thousands of electrical connections. Finding this single wire was like hunting for a loose rivet on the Eiffel Tower.

“But like all of the accidents we investigate,this was preventable,” Homendy said. “Implementing NTSB recommendations in this investigation will prevent similar tragedies in the future.”

Contributing to the collapse of the Key Bridge and the loss of life was the lack of countermeasures to reduce the bridge’s vulnerability to collapse due to impact by ocean-going vessels, which have only grown larger since the Key Bridge’s opening in 1977. When the Japan-flagged containership Blue Nagoya contacted the Key Bridge after losing propulsion in 1980, the 390-foot-long vessel caused only minor damage. The Dali, however, is 10 times the size of the Blue Nagoya. 


​The comparative sizes of the Blue Nagoya and the Dali relative to the Key Bridge. (Source: NTSB)

As part of the investigation, the NTSB in March released an initial report on the vulnerability of bridges nationwide to large vessel strikes. The report found that the Maryland Transportation Authority—and many other owners of bridges spanning navigable waterways used by ocean-going vessels—were likely unaware of the potential risk that a vessel collision could pose to their structures. This was despite longstanding guidance from the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials recommending that bridge owners perform these assessments. 

The NTSB sent letters to 30 bridge owners identified in the report, urging them to evaluate their bridges and, if needed, develop plans to reduce risks. All recipients have since responded, and the status of each recommendation is available on the NTSB’s website.

 As a result of the investigation, the NTSB issued new safety recommendations to the US Coast Guard; US Federal Highway Administration; the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials; the Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (ClassNK); the American National Standards Institute; the American National Standards Institute Accredited Standards Committee on Safety in Construction and Demolitions Operations A10; HD Hyundai Heavy Industries; Synergy Marine Pte. Ltd; and WAGO Corporation, the electrical component manufacturer; and multiple bridge owners across the nation.

A synopsis of actions taken Tuesday, including the probable cause, findings and recommendations, can be found on ntsb.gov​. The complete investigation report will be released in the coming weeks.  

To report an incident/accident or if you are a public safety agency, please call 1-844-373-9922 or 202-314-6290 to speak to a Watch Officer at the NTSB Response Operations Center (ROC) in Washington, DC (24/7).

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