Authored by Andrew Korybko via Substack,

The convergence of interests between the US, Pakistan, and the Taliban means that a compromise between them to this end can’t be ruled out no matter how unlikely it might appear to be right now.

Trump’s recent reaffirmation of his plans to return US troops to Afghanistan’s Bagram Airbase was rejected by the Taliban, which was to be expected for appearance’s sake at this point while talks are reportedly underway, but another obstacle comes from Pakistan’s opposition. It recently released a joint statement with China, Iran, and Russia condemning the US’ plans. Nevertheless, since Pakistan would benefit from them and openly backs his Gaza plan, its statement shouldn’t be taken at face value.

Trump’s plans stand no chance of fulfillment without Pakistan facilitating the US’ military logistics. In exchange for its passive support, the de facto military junta expects that the US will:

1) help it defeat Islamabad-designated Taliban-backed terrorist groups (the Islamist TTP and the separatist BLA);

2) aid in subordinating Afghanistan as Pakistan’s junior partner for creating a regional sphere of influence; and

3) co-finance the PAKAFUZ railway for more robustly competing with the “North-South Transport Corridor”.

The US might accede to Pakistan’s requests given the importance that it places on returning US troops to Bagram Airbase. Its strategic objectives can be summarized as:

1) simultaneously threatening Russia, China, and Iran per Trump’s repeatedly confirmed interests;

2) profiting from Afghanistan’s reported $1 trillion worth of minerals; and

3) pioneering a southern vector of Western influence into Central Asia via Pakistan-Afghanistan for complementing the western one via Turkiye-Armenia-Azerbaijan.

For their part, the Taliban are expected to continue resisting these plans for the following three reasons:

1) they’re Pashtun ethno-nationalists who’ve historically refused to voluntarily subordinate themselves to anyone;

2) the recent memory of American occupation and circumstantially coerced junior partnership vis-à-vis Pakistan before that are still fresh in their minds; and

3) hosting US troops could ruin the Sino-Russo dimension of their foreign policy and thus derail their geostrategic balancing act.

Nevertheless, the newly restored US-Pak regional duopoly probably won’t stop them trying to advance their geostrategically aligned goals in Afghanistan, which could take the form of:

1) trying to buy off the Taliban in order to at least ensure the return of US troops to Bagram Airbase;

2) subverting Afghanistan by exploiting the Taliban’s fault lines to sow division within its ranks together with backing resistance (both ethnic and terrorist) to its rule; and

3) employing military force (in the least likely scenario).

It’s possible that a compromise could be reached for returning US troops to Bagram Airbase and possibly extracting Afghanistan’s minerals if the US:

1) bribes the Taliban by making generous monthly payments, unfreezing Afghanistan’s $9.5 billion-worth of US-based funds, and providing regular humanitarian aid through Pakistan;

2) guarantees Afghanistan’s security (vis-à-vis Pakistan) through a Qatari-like pact; and

3) makes no policy demands of the Taliban (possibly other than it ending support for the TTP and BLA).

In spite of the aforesaid proposal, such a deal might either not come to pass or last if:

1) the Taliban refuse to end support for the TTP and BLA (or lies that it will but is then exposed);

2) a hardline Taliban faction threatens civil war if this deal goes through; and/or

3) China far outmatches the US’ bribes in exchange for the Taliban keeping America out of Afghanistan.

It’s impossible to predict with certainty what’ll happen other than concluding that Afghanistan is now a theater of intense New Cold War rivalry.