比特币的安全预算问题:问题、解决方案和神话被揭穿
Bitcoin's Security Budget Issue: Problems, Solutions and Myths Debunked

原始链接: https://budget.day/

在工作量证明系统中,哈希率本身并不是一个可靠的安全指标。安全性源于生成哈希所需的现实世界经济成本,而不是产生的哈希的绝对数量。更便宜的硬件或能源可以在不增强安全性的情况下提高哈希率。较低的比特币(BTC)挖矿奖励会削弱诚实行为的动机,使攻击的执行成本更低,而不管哈希率是否很高。 此外,比特币的未来美元价值并不能保证安全。安全预算必须以BTC进行评估,因为矿工的工资和攻击的资金都是以BTC支付的。无论比特币的美元价格如何,资金不足的采矿网络都容易受到贿赂和激励攻击,因为攻击者的成本很低。假设攻击者从头开始构建基础设施是不现实的,因为如果回报超过忠诚度,现有的矿工可能会受到恶意行为的影响。

这条黑客新闻讨论了比特币迫在眉睫的“安全预算”问题,因为区块奖励减少,交易费用需要补偿矿工。提出了几种解决方案,包括动态块大小(如门罗币和以太坊)、尾部排放(持续的小通货膨胀),甚至是燃烧休眠硬币等有争议的措施。 反对增加区块大小的论点指出,可能会增加集中化,并线性增加费用,而不一定会吸引更多的交易。建议使用合并挖掘侧链Drivechain等替代方案来汇总费用。有人对51%攻击的成本表示担忧,评论者对估计的准确性和这种攻击的经济不合理性进行了辩论。一张海报上写着“增加区块大小只会线性增加费用” 争论还围绕着通过社区分叉和协议更改来防御51%攻击的实用性展开。总体而言,讨论强调了在交易费用主导的未来确保比特币长期安全的复杂挑战。
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原文

"There’s no security issue — the is growing, that means everything is okay!"

The output of Proof⁠-⁠of⁠-⁠Work isn’t hashrate — it’s economic cost. What matters is not how many hashes are produced, but how expensive they are to produce. A growing hashrate means nothing if it's powered by cheaper hardware or cheaper electricity.

In other words, security doesn’t come from numbers on a graph — it comes from real⁠-⁠world costs burned to defend the network.

If the BTC-denominated rewards drop, miners may still produce high hashrate — but with fewer incentives to stay honest. That opens the door to cheap attacks, especially if the cost of hardware or electricity falls. It’s not about how much hash you see — it’s about how costly it is to fake.

"The price of Bitcoin will rise, so even a tiny subsidy — like 1 satoshi — could still be worth a lot in the future!"

This logic is flawed. The security budget must be evaluated in BTC terms, not in USD. Miners are paid in BTC, and attacks can be funded in BTC. It’s unreasonable to expect that an economy worth 2,100,000,000,000,000 satoshis can remain secure if it only spends 1 satoshi every 10 minutes on defense. If miners are underpaid, they can simply be bribed with BTC, regardless of how high the USD price is.

"But the cost of an attack is more than just the security budget — you’d need to buy ASICs, hardware, etc."

That’s true only if the attacker builds everything from scratch. In reality, existing miners can be bribed or incentivized to cooperate. If the network underpays them, they may find betrayal more profitable than honest mining — especially if there's no long⁠-⁠term reward to stay loyal.

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