Authored by Andrew Korybko via substack,

Geographic reasons make this a practical necessity if he wants to restore the US’ military presence at Bagram Airbase and/or return some of the equipment that Biden left there during the withdrawal.

Trump surprised many when he recently declared that he wants to restore the US’ military presence at Afghanistan’s Bagram Airbase and return some of the equipment that Biden left during the withdrawal. 

He justified the first on the basis that it’s just one hour away from where China makes (likely meaning bases) its nuclear weapons and claimed that it now allegedly occupies Bagram.

The second, meanwhile, was justified due to the dangers presented by the Taliban selling this equipment to other groups.

Trump also expressed frustration that the US is allegedly spending billions of dollars each year helping to keep Afghanistan afloat. 

Even if he successfully leverages foreign aid in advance of these interconnected military-strategic goals, which might be counterproductive if China replaces lost American support to entrench its influence in Afghanistan, then he’ll still likely have to cut a deal with Pakistan. 

That’s because the most viable way for the US to access Afghanistan is from its traditional partner’s airspace and roads.

The problem though is that a growing number of issues have begun to beset their partnership. These include the US’ preference for India as its top regional partner in recent years, criticism of a military court’s conviction of 25 civilians a few months ago in connection with unrest over Imran Khan’s scandalous jailing, and newfound concerns about the true intentions of its long-range missile program. Pakistan is also disappointed that the US hasn’t taken its side over the Taliban amidst their tensions.

While it’s possible that Pakistan’s de facto military regime might literally sell out their nation’s abovementioned interests to let the US transit across its territory en route to Afghanistan if Trump reaches a deal with the Taliban, which is itself easier said than done, that can’t be taken for granted. They might very well bargain hard on some issues in order to receive more than just pecuniary benefits. This could take the form of demanding more military equipment and an end to alleged US meddling.

The first could be manipulated to create the optics of the US rebalancing its relations with India for the purpose of provoking an overreaction from the latter’s decisionmakers or media, while the second could silence criticism of Imran Khan’s scandalous jailing and relieve pressure on its missile program. Of course, another possibility exists, and it’s that Trump doesn’t negotiate fairly with Pakistan but instead ramps up pressure upon it and then promises to reverse what was just added in exchange for what he wants.

That could be accomplished via more official attention being paid to Imran Khan’s case in parallel with threatening the curtailment of existing military aid and sanctions over its missile program. All that would change if Pakistan capitulated to this newfound comprehensive pressure campaign is that the intensity would simply revert back to what it once was instead of remaining high. Instead of giving him what he wants, however, Pakistan might abandon its Sino-US balancing act to defiantly pivot towards China.

That might not be the best course of action from the perspective of Pakistan’s objective national interests since the US could deal a lot of strategic damage to its renegade partner in that scenario. Its military and political leadership could be personally sanctioned, all aid might be immediately withheld, and Trump could double down on the sale of the latest military-technical equipment to India. All of this could also be paired with sectoral sanctions, including secondary ones, for generating more unrest.

Nevertheless, none of this might come to pass since it’s ultimately dependent on Trump reaching a deal with the Taliban for returning to Bagram Airbase and/or returning some of its military equipment that Biden left in Afghanistan, neither of which should be taken for granted. It also remains unclear how serious Trump is about this since he might have just been spitballing like he’s known to sometimes do. Although unlikely, there’s also an out-of-the-box solution, which will now be touched upon.

In the event that a deal is reached with the Taliban but Pakistan remains obstinate in cutting its own with the US, then the US might reach a deal with the Central Asian Republics to facilitate the exit of US military equipment and/or allow the US military transit rights to return to Bagram. This corridor, which relies on the South Caucasus for access to the Eurasian Heartland, was in effect during most of the American occupation of Afghanistan and was referred to as the “Northern Distribution Network”.

In the contemporary geopolitical conditions, this could be achieved in coordination with Russia as a manifestation of the nascent Russian-US “New Détente”, the details of which are beyond the scope of this analysis but can be learned more about from the preceding four hyperlinked analyses. This wouldn’t be anywhere near as economical as securing transit through Pakistan, but it could suffice if that country refuses to cut a deal, and even the possibility might be enough to get its policymakers to reconsider.

Altogether, everything depends on how serious Trump is on reaching a deal with the Taliban; him successfully clinching such; and then the success of his efforts to reach a related one with Pakistan. It’s too early to tell either way in any of these three cases, but any progress on the first part would then put Pakistan in the spotlight, thus making this analysis very relevant. Until then, observers should casually monitor this issue, but they should also temper expectations about anything significant happening.