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| > Who was stopping anyone from doing it then, and who is stopping anyone from doing it now?
The folks who either (a) got in early on the IPv4 address land rush (especially the Western developed countries), or (b) with buckets of money who buy addresses. If you're India, there probably weren't enough IPv4 address in the first place to handle your population, so you're doing IPv6: * https://www.google.com/intl/en/ipv6/statistics.html#tab=per-... Or even if you're in the West, if you're poor (a community Native American ISP): > We learned a very expensive lesson. 71% of the IPv4 traffic we were supporting was from ROKU devices. 9% coming from DishNetwork & DirectTV satellite tuners, 11% from HomeSecurity cameras and systems, and remaining 9% we replaced extremely outdated Point of Sale(POS) equipment. So we cut ROKU some slack three years ago by spending a little over $300k just to support their devices. * https://community.roku.com/t5/Features-settings-updates/It-s... * Discussion: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=35047624 IPv4 'wasn't a problem' because the megacorps who generally run things where I'm guessing you're from (the West) were able to solve it in other means… until they can't. T-Mobile US has 120M and a few years ago it turns out that money couldn't solve IPv4-only anymore so they went to IPv6: * https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QGbxCKAqNUE IPv6 is not taking off because IPv4 (and NAT/STUN/TURN) is 'better', but rather because (a) inertial, and (b) it 'works' (with enough kludges thrown at it). |
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| On a directly connected outside system, you can set a route for your LAN address space via that router and it will just work. It requires telco or physical access but I have in fact done this before. |
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| > Also, NAT is desirable for security/network isolation reasons […]
This is security theatre. People have been saying that NAT is not a security feature for over a decade: * https://blog.ipspace.net/2011/12/is-nat-security-feature/ but the message still has not sunk in. The "Zero Trust" paper was published by John Kindervag in 2010: * https://media.paloaltonetworks.com/documents/Forrester-No-Mo... Most modern attacks start from a compromised internal host (e.g., from phishing), or through stolen credentials via a remote access method. The above is "castle-and-moat" thinking that tends to have weaker internal controls because it is thought the internal network is "hidden" from the dangerous outside network. Set your firewall to default deny, then add a rule for allow outgoing connections, followed by only allow incoming connections if they are replies. For most machines (and networks), most of the time, this is what's needed: the above is applicable for both IPv6 and IPv4 (with or without NAT). The protection comes from filtering (generally) and stateful packet inspection, not from hiding addresses. > […] and having no distinction between a local IP and a public IP has a lot of disadvantages. Just because something has a global addresses does not mean global reachability (see default deny above). Further you can layout your IPv6 address plan so that you can tell at a glance if hosts are externally accessible. Using a /48 a basis, you break out sixteen /52s, numbered $PREFIX:[0-f]000::/52. To make it easier to remember what is externally accessible, you put all of those hosts in $PREFIX:e000::/52, where e stands for external. That /52 can then be broken down into: * sixteen /56s * 256 /60s * 4096 /64s or any combination thereof. See Figure A-5 for various ways to slice and dice: * https://www.oreilly.com/library/view/ipv6-address-planning/9... Everything in $PREFIX:[0-d,f]000::/52 is not externally reachable. |
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| >https://blog.ipspace.net/2011/12/is-nat-security-feature/
>>Basic NAT (as defined in RFC 2663) performs just the IP address translation (one inside host to one IP address in the NAT pool). The moment the inside host starts a session through the NAT, it becomes fully exposed to the outside world.
This is a lie. A "session through the NAT" does not really expose the host to the outside world, because in 99% of the cases this is a TCP session, and the NAT machine would drop all "out of order" packets. >Most modern attacks start from a compromised internal host (e.g., from phishing), or through stolen credentials via a remote access method. Your statement is a perfect example of https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Survivorship_bias. Most modern attacks start from an internal host exactly because NAT makes external attacks infeasible for the majority of scenarios. >Set your firewall to default deny, then add a rule for allow outgoing connections, followed by only allow incoming connections if they are replies. What about I don't do it, and the system is still _automatically_ secure, because NAT does exactly that while being _required_ for the system to work. >See Figure A-5 LOL. What about I don't see any figures, and the system still works and is secure for the 99% of the cases. |
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| > who remembers them nowadays?
0118 999 881 999 119 725… 3
Me, that’s the new number for the emergency services. Actually, that’s the only phone number I can remember :D |
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| Because the fields are there for humans, in the packet itself it’s a 32bit integer, and you can’t just arbitrarily make the src/dest fields in the packet bigger— it stops being IPv4 then. |
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| What kind of Nat though? You can use upnp, predictable mapping, etc. and still allow the traffic through. And that's only with ipv4, because you can run zerotier over IPv6. |
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| > What kind of Nat though? You can use upnp, predictable mapping, etc. and still allow the traffic through.
Your computer can talk to your home router (CPE) and punch a hole for a connection, but if your WAN port does not have a public IP address, but rather itself also has a private address (probably 100.64/10), the CPE cannot talk to the ISP's router to punch a hole: * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carrier-grade_NAT The two layers of NAT (home network (192.168) -> CPE NAT (100.64/10) -> ISP NAT ('real' public IPv4)) prevent hole punching. |
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| Great for you for not having to experience it, but that doesn't mean it sucks any less for those less fortunate:
> Our [Native American] tribal network started out IPv6, but soon learned we had to somehow support IPv4 only traffic. It took almost 11 months in order to get a small amount of IPv4 addresses allocated for this use. In fact there were only enough addresses to cover maybe 1% of population. So we were forced to create a very expensive proxy/translation server in order to support this traffic. > We learned a very expensive lesson. 71% of the IPv4 traffic we were supporting was from ROKU devices. 9% coming from DishNetwork & DirectTV satellite tuners, 11% from HomeSecurity cameras and systems, and remaining 9% we replaced extremely outdated Point of Sale(POS) equipment. So we cut ROKU some slack three years ago by spending a little over $300k just to support their devices. * https://community.roku.com/t5/Features-settings-updates/It-s... * Discussion: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=35047624 |
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| > I have no problem criticizing tech companies, but I try to wait until they behave badly.
I'd rather not wait until they have a (quasi-)monopoly on something though. Twitter was great until… |
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| Look at how the early 90s Ford Tempo resale value compared to Toyotas of the era. Trash cars don't keep their value. Toyota could then charge a premium because they were known for quality. |
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| I think that is excessively negative take. Tailscales value proposition is also "you can connect to your network wherever you are, safely, and others cannot". That does not go away because of IPsec. |
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| Not sure if parent means wireguard, but my GitHub page has a way to get around cgnat using wireguard for use with a Nintendo switch (or any wifi/etc device that doesn't run an editable OS) |
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| Or they'll just get bought by Microsoft, Amazon, or Cloudflare and that'll be that
I like Tailscale just because it's OpenVPN without the unbearable agony of setting it up so it actually works |
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| Nothing that I've noticed. I actually have never run vanilla Tailscale without Headscale so I'm not sure.
I think auto TLS requires some extra config, and DNS rules. I don't use it so I'm not sure. |
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| > Can anyone elighten me regarding what is different or special about 100.64.0.0/10 vs say, 192.168.0.0 or 10.0.0.0.
A bit of context: if an ISP cannot get enough IPv4 addresses for the WAN-side of people's home routers, some problems exist: * something in 192.168/16 is generally used for the LAN-side of people's home routers, so that cannot be used on the WAN side * 10/8 is used for business/enterprise corporate networks, so it also cannot be used on the WAN side because if people VPN connect to the corporate, then the router may get confused * similarly for 172.12/12: often used for corporate networks So the IETF/IANA set aside 100.64.0.0/10 as it had no 'legacy' of use anywhere else, and is specifically called out to only be used for ISPs for CG-NAT purposes. This way its routing does not clash with any other use (home or corporate/business).
* https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6598.html |
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| Tailscale does p2p, not hub-spoke, with additional DERP system which combines various NAT bypasses with worst case hair pinning over HTTPS - you can host all components yourself. |
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| I use WireGuard. As you add more keypairs, it becomes a bit of a nightmare to maintain, though Vim with syntax highlighting helps a lot.
Because of this, I'll be switching to Headscale + Tailscale. |
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| I use Nebula because its iOS client does not drain my battery. Tailscale has had that known bug for years and they never managed to fix it, which is a major deal breaker. |
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| Yggdrasil would indeed better fit the description. It should however be noted, that, while it does work great, is still a research project. |
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| Is your dad running Windows? Windows firewall is known to block icmp traffic, a problem that neither Tailscale nor any other p2p VPN can solve. |
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| Ping uses ICMP. Windows blocks ICMP by default, so yes `ping ` doesn't work by default. Is your system your father was trying to ping a Windows system as well?
The other thing to check is if he was running another VPN on his machine at the same time. Running multiple VPNs at the same time (both Windows and Linux) requires extra fiddling to map the routing correctly to prevent their rules from overlapping/breaking each. https://tailscale.com/kb/1105/other-vpns |
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| What is the alternative, here? Letting all machines on a tailnet talk sounds like a security issue. Maybe a better onboarding flow that prompts you to set ACLs when inviting a new user? |
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| This rests on the incorrect assumption, pointed out in the post, that most applications need the kind of scale that warrants quickly scaling to more servers. |
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| > That is not ARP problem. Its called broadcast storm and its problem of stupid people and/or bad equipment. You can bring any network down with incompetence.
It's a footgun. All footguns have ways to not trigger them, but saying you can't blow off a leg is also inaccurate. Reducing the number of footguns laying about is generally a good thing > Now take a look at ND tables exchaustion alone. No different than ARP table exhaustion (a finite L2-L3 mapping table). "First hop security" is a thing in both protocols. > So, IPv6 should be simple, easy to implement and so less prone to mistakes. All extras should be put layer up. I would argue that IPv6 is simpler to get going than IPv4: to start you don't need BOOTP/DHCP. In fact IPv4 later took some ideas from IPv6, e.g., 169.254.0.0/16 link-local addresses:
* https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3927 |
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| > Crypto moves fast, every 10 years many protocols are obsoleted. How you will provide E2E connectivity with that?
Negotiation. IPsec using IKEv2 (RFC 4306/7296) started with (e.g.) 3DES when it was initially released, but now allows for AES (RFC 3602, 3686, etc), as well as other algorithms: * https://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters/ikev2-para... > What IPng team should do, is just take IPv4, extended it to 64bit, call it IPv6 and we are done. For anyone curious, the technical criteria for choosing the (then-labelled) IPng: * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc1726 And the evaluation of the available candidates and why the winner was chosen: * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc1752 One of the IPng candidates, SIPP, indeed did extend addressing from 32-bits to 64-bits (RFC 1710, RFC 1752 § 7.2), but it was deemed that it may not enough and another transition would be even more difficult, so they went with 128-bits (RFC 1752 § 9). Adding mechanisms for auto-configuration was one of the criteria for IPng; per RFC 1726 § 5.8:
In a world of IoT, not having to have a BOOTP/DHCP(v4) seems like decent foresight. |
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| Here is a list of of proposals for what could have replaced IPv4:
* https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1454.html Here are the technical criteria for choosing the (then-labelled) IPng: * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc1726 And finally the evaluation of the available candidates and why the winner was chosen: * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc1752 If someone doesn't want to use IPv6, then what they're effectively suggesting is that we create a new protocol, and role it out to every smartphone, tablet, laptop, desktop, server, (Wifi) router/CPE, ISP router, SMB router, enterprise switches, and IoT device. Meanwhile we've already effectively run out of IPv4 addresses (e.g., ARIN and RIPE pools are zero) and are just shuffling about whatever is left in auctions. > There's one thing I forgot to mention in that big long story above: somewhere in that whole chain of events, we completely stopped using bus networks. Ethernet is not actually a bus anymore. It just pretends to be a bus. Basically, we couldn't get ethernet's famous CSMA/CD to keep working as speeds increased, so we went back to the good old star topology. Except for 802.11 Wifi. |
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| > I really liked the premise of the post until I got to the last paragraph and had to do a quick double take.
"Be sure to drink your Ovaltine." |
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| Wireguard by itself is good, but it isn't nice. Tailscale is nice because it builds on top of Wireguard (which is good) and adds UX stuff (which makes it nice).
Nice requires humane UX. |
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| Tailscale doesn't even try to hide their MP or DP traffic. Last I checked, management was plain https and data was plain wireguard. |
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| I agree. This is article reads well. It has flow, good punctuation and pacing. Apart from the message that we will eventually pay Tithe to our new overlord tailscale, it was great. |
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| Did anyone else immediately do the calculation of 8.1 billion (world population 2024) * 1/20000 = 405k user base? Which makes me wonder what percentage are paying users. |
(Repost of <https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=38570370>)