Authored by Alastair Paynter via OilPrice,

• A budget deficit of 5.1% and public debt exceeding 115% of GDP raise concerns about France's fiscal sustainability and the eurozone's resilience.
• Industrial decline, energy disruptions, political instability and growing nationalist movements are putting pressure on EU cohesion.
• France's presidential election, Poland's political crisis and the rise of Central European nationalism could accelerate divisions within the bloc.

France's present economic woes signal serious trouble ahead for the coherence of the European Union. On Wednesday evening, the French National Assembly unanimously rejected the government's proposed budget, provoking further fears in the bond market. A couple of weeks ago, it was reported that the French government's budget deficit now stood at 5.1 per cent, the worst it had been for nearly a quarter of a century. Its national debt now stands at over 115 percent of its GDP. Last Friday, the credit ratings agency Fitch downgraded the outlook for France from stable to negative. How close might we be to a French default?

There are precious few good options for dealing with such a scenario. Permitting a country of France's magnitude to default would undoubtedly undermine international confidence in the Euro, at a time when most EU economies have been struggling under the weight of multiple pressures. However, the only possible means of preventing a sovereign default would be a bailout from the European Central Bank. This option would place an immense burden on Germany and would hit savers there hard. While bailing Greece out in 2010, 2012 and 2015 was considered a necessary course of action to stabilise international markets and save the Eurozone, the prospect of having to do the same for France could prove a bridge too far.

For its part, the German economy has also been under immense pressure for several years, particularly as the industrial sector has suffered under the dual burden of extensive Green regulations, enacted during the high water mark of climate politics during the late 2010s and early 2020s, and geopolitical crises such as the Russia-Ukraine war and the US-Israeli war with Iran and the turmoil in the Straits of Hormuz.

It appears increasingly possible that Marine Le Pen might win the French Presidential election next May. But even if that does happen, would she be able to meaningfully address France's economic woes or would she be forced to comply with the EU? She has at present promised to cut French public spending to below 50 per cent of GDP by 2032. Yet even relatively modest measures to cut spending tend to be met with fierce protest, making the issue a particularly thorny one for politicians of any stripe. France has of course for several weeks been rocked by widespread protests, rioting and looting as the social fabric frays. Regular politics appears to offer few solutions.

The instability of the political system is evident in the fact that five Prime Ministers have served under President Macron since 2022. It must be noted that this is not a uniquely French problem. In fact, the same effect can be observed both inside and outside the EU as a kind of 'vortex effect' seems to be in operation as the postwar era comes to a close and we enter a kind of interregnum before the new era emerges. For those taking the broader historical view, a number of political, economic and social cycles are coming to an end at roughly the same time. And while it is true that modern mass democracies tend to be characterised by a short political cycle and a high time preference among decision makers, these processes have sped up even more as governments repeatedly break down and instability mounts. The larger question is whether any leader can emerge who can break free from this vortex effect or whether the pattern is doomed to repeat until the system breaks down entirely.

The world has been moving away from globalism and towards a more multinodal, 'nationalist' arrangement. Yet despite this, even many of the major populist and nationalist political parties and leaders across the West are still operating within the general envelope of the postwar consensus. As the case of Italy under Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni illustrates, even in those countries where such parties have won elections and formed governments, significant change from the prior globalist status quo has not been forthcoming.

This makes it more likely that the present collection of nationalist parties across the EU and elsewhere does not in fact represent the final form that nationalist politics will take. It is quite likely that the longer the present period of turbulence persists, the more hardline political options will emerge. Certainly, if the present political establishment continues to double down on the failed strategic imperatives of yesterday they will only stiffen the very opposition they claim to oppose, running the risk of further and greater crises.

While the integrity of the Euro as both a concept and a practical reality remains the most pressing issue for the immediate coherence of the EU, it is important to keep an eye on other political pressure points too. For instance, the present political and constitutional crisis in Poland will prove a major stress test for the EU. The outcome of the conflict between pro-EU Prime Minister Donald Tusk and the nationalist opposition rallying around President Karol Nawrocki will provide an important indication as to how the globalist-nationalist dynamic could develop across the EU more widely.

Longer-term, all global indicators appear to suggest the ascendance of nationalism and the waning of globalism. The outcome of the Polish crisis could either slightly delay or accelerate this process in Europe. Poland is of growing geostrategic significance in Europe. Its economy is one of the few within the EU that has actually grown significantly over the last few years, while its central bank has in recent years pursued a policy of gold acquisition that now places the country amongst the top ten national gold holdings in the world, standing at over 630 tonnes. As I predicted in my risk report Europe 2026, the Central European region - comprising Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary - could over time begin to assume an even more significant regional power unit within Europe. This possibility would also be affected by the outcome of the present war between Ukraine and Russia, which will obviously have a major impact on the broader strategic landscape of the continent as a whole.

2027 could therefore see an acceleration of existing trends as multiple separate crises converge. The ability of governments to respond effectively to such a 'polycrisis' will be a major pointer to the durability or even survivability of supranational power structures, such as the EU, all of which were constructed in a very different epoch and context.