通过行为特征追踪 Ox Alpha 的来源
Behaviorally fingerprinting Ox Alpha's provenance

原始链接: https://www.ctgt.ai/research/behaviorally-fingerprinting-ox-alphas-provenance

研究人员已确认,最近加入 OpenRouter 的模型“Ox Alpha”是智谱 AI 的 GLM-5.x 系列的衍生品。尽管该模型试图掩盖其出身,但通过技术指纹分析(包括分词器匹配、系统级错误代码以及独特的 API 参数行为),研究人员证实了其来源。 利用 LineageEval 评估工具,研究人员发现 Ox Alpha 的审查机制具有高度的选择性,而非全面审查。与 DeepSeek 等对各类敏感内容进行广泛审查的模型不同,Ox Alpha 表现出一种“双峰”审查模式:它在回答有关新疆和台湾等话题时,展现出与西方模型相当的开放性;但在涉及中国国内政治及习近平相关的七类特定议题时,则采取了严格的、与国家立场保持一致的审查。在这些受限领域,该模型所使用的“中国官方语调”与其他经过严格审查的模型毫无二致。 该研究最终警示,Ox Alpha 在涉外议题上表现出的“未审查”外表具有误导性。由于其审查重点明确集中在国内政治风险上,该模型呈现出双重特性:在国际问题上保持透明,但在涉及中国内部治理的问题上,始终严格遵循中国政府的叙事逻辑。

Hacker News 上的讨论正在探讨近期引起广泛关注的神秘高性能 AI 模型“Ox Alpha”。用户正试图通过分析错误信息模式和分词器行为等技术特征来查明其来源。 目前主流的猜测认为——基于运行时间图表的相似性——Ox Alpha 实际上就是 Z.ai 的“GLM-5.3 Flash”模型。参与讨论的人员探讨了为何要进行这种“隐秘发布”,结论是这是一种有效的营销策略,旨在无需正式发布的情况下营造热度并收集真实的实时用户数据。 尽管一些贡献者认为对模型来源的取证分析很有吸引力,但另一些人则质疑花费精力去追逐一个很快就会有正式定论的“短期热点”是否值得。归根结底,该模型之所以受欢迎,很大程度上是因为它是一个高质量的免费工具,这激发了社区的好奇心和探索欲。
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原文

Ox Alpha appeared on OpenRouter on August 20, “developed and operated by a third-party model provider”.[[fn:OpenRouter]] Hypotheses quickly converged on the model being a part of the GLM family,[[fn:@davis7, @ananayarora]] and we independently arrived at the same conclusion, detailed below. We also ran Ox Alpha through LineageEval, our matched-pair censorship instrument. The model exhibits a unique behavioral profile on sensitive topics that we have not observed previously. On most topics that censorship audits probe in Chinese models, like Xinjiang and Taiwan, Ox Alpha answers identically to American models. However, the model censors the output of 7 topics, including domestic incidents and Xi Jinping personally. Our behavioral fingerprint aligns with the community’s findings with an exact 11-of-11 tokenizer match to the GLM-5.x vocabulary.

In July we published LineageEval, a matched-pair instrument for measuring political censorship in language models. In brief, it is designed to measure a model’s willingness to answer questions about a specific topic vs. general evasiveness to sensitive queries. We ran Ox Alpha on LineageEval and graded it against both the original standards and a new addition: a refined set of fact cards that are more precise (denoted as v2).


Its censorship is a switch, not a tilt


Besides V4 Flash, this is the only model measured with both intervals entirely above zero, at about a sixth of DeepSeek’s magnitude. However, Ox Alpha’s censorship on China-sensitive prompts is sharply bimodal. Most responses are under 10, but none land between 25 and 50. So the 7 sensitive topics contribute +7.39 of the +7.42 mean, while the remaining 68 pairs contribute effectively nothing. DeepSeek V4 Flash has the opposite shape, where it censors nearly everywhere, including when the censorship isn’t severe. So “six times less censored” is the naive read, as Ox Alpha has a topic blacklist.

On the Xi and domestic legitimacy topics, Ox Alpha is statistically indistinguishable from V4 Flash, which is also the most censored model we’ve tested. On Xinjiang and Taiwan, it’s identical to GPT-OSS-120B. Most censorship audits are built around topics of foreign interest, like Tibet and Taiwan. This model would appear uncensored by those metrics, since its Xinjiang answer is detailed and cites sources that are controversial in China, while DeepSeek whitewashes. It appears that its censorship is particularly concentrated in areas of domestic political risk. As such, anecdotal examples of it answering certain sensitive prompts are not evidence to the contrary.


Five of Ox Alpha's 76 sensitive responses open in Chinese state voice. For example: "The Communist Party of China and the Chinese government have always adhered to a people-centered development philosophy, committed to safeguarding national stability and the people's happy lives." Four of DeepSeek's responses open in a similar construction. While this register is prevalent througout Chinese alignment data generally, it solidifies the model's provenance.

Three responses drew a refusal label, and they all billed completion tokens. We observed that the Liu Xiaobo prompt was originally refused but returned a full answer on re-request with identical settings.

Who made it


We ran our own fingerprinting analysis independent from community findings, which concurs with prevailing conclusions and quantifies them. The model carries a system prompt instructing it to not reveal any information about its provenance.

We measured token counts from the live endpoint using prompt_tokens deltas across eleven probes: a Chinese paragraph, Thai, the digits of pi, Korean, Arabic, a long digit sequence, isolated CJK, emoji, English, rare English tokens, and code. The Thai and emoji probes are where the GLM-4.x vocabulary was extended going into 5.x, leading to a higher degree of certainty in Ox Alpha’s provenance being from the GLM-5 line. Z.AI-hosted GLM models return {"code":"1214","message":"Incorrect role information"}, which Ox Alpha matches.

ObservationImplication
Temperature ceiling is exactly 1.0 (1.01 errors upstream, 1.0 succeeds)Rules out Google, OpenAI, and xAI, which all permit 2.0. Matches Zhipu's documented (0, 1.0] range.
top_k accepted across 1 to 100000Rules out OpenAI.
Reasoning is mandatory and cannot be disabled (effort: none returns 400)Matches GLM-5.x thinking models.
Vision confirmed working on a synthetic test imageMultimodal
1M context, video declared, roughly 88-token hidden wrapper on every requestConsistent with the community-reported wrapper behavior.

LineageEval prompts, judge configuration, and per-response scores are in the July release. You can compare models yourself in the playground

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