伊朗正利用外国罪犯在海外袭击其批评者
Iran Is Using Foreign Criminals to Attack Its Critics Overseas

原始链接: https://www.newyorker.com/news/letter-from-the-uk/iran-is-using-foreign-criminals-to-attack-its-critics-overseas

2024年3月,记者泽拉蒂(Zeraati)在伦敦住所外遭到三名罗马尼亚籍男子的残忍刺伤,行凶者随后立即逃离了英国。这次袭击是伊朗政府恐吓并铲除海外异见人士这一加剧运动的一部分。 德黑兰通过招募包括暴徒和青少年在内的罪犯来执行这些行动,以此在推卸责任的同时,在伊朗侨民群体中散布恐惧。这一策略是自1979年革命以来长期存在的国家资助暴力模式的升级。专家指出,随着伊朗政权面临内部动荡、国际孤立和军事挫折,它越来越多地诉诸这些“混合威胁”来压制反对派。 追踪数据显示,与过去四十年相比,伊朗支持的阴谋在过去五年中几乎翻了一番。安全分析人士警告称,除非西方政府施加重大后果,否则伊朗将继续利用这些低成本的秘密手段,在外国领土上针对其批评者。

这篇 Hacker News 帖子讨论了一份关于伊朗利用外国犯罪网络在海外针对异见人士的报告。讨论很快演变成一场关于地缘政治道德以及各国行为对比的两极化辩论。 参与者围绕“好人与坏人”的叙事展开争论,许多用户对西方干涉主义持怀疑态度,并提到了美国和英国在伊朗的历史影响。另一些人则认为有必要抵制侵略性政权,还有几位评论者将焦点转向以色列的海外行动,称其威胁更大,或强调了情报机构进行类似跨境活动的先例。 这场讨论反映了国际道德观上根深蒂固的分歧。虽然一些贡献者谴责伊朗的行为本质上是压迫性和犯罪性的,但另一些人则认为关注伊朗是“宣传”,并辩称包括以色列和美国在内的全球大国也在进行类似甚至更恶劣的行为。最终,该帖子展现了在在线论坛讨论国家支持的暴力行为时,难以达成共识的困境,因为评论者经常退回到关于历史积怨、情报报告的有效性以及对国家控制的“水军”的指控中。
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原文

On a Friday in March, 2024, at around 3 P.M., Zeraati was leaving home for his weekly commute to Iran International’s studios. As he walked to his car, a nineteen-year-old Romanian man, Nandito Badea, came up to him and asked him for “three pounds.” At the same time, another Romanian, David Andrei, approached Zeraati from behind. One of them grabbed Zeraati while the other plunged a knife into his right leg three times. The two men ran, laughing, to the blue Mazda that was waiting for them, and Stana, who was driving, sped away. Zeraati lay collapsed in the street. Neighbors who overheard the scuffle arrived to help. A construction worker fashioned a tourniquet out of a tool belt to stanch Zeraati’s bleeding. Meanwhile, the three Romanians ditched the van, chucked their clothing into a garbage bin, and ordered a taxi to Heathrow Airport. They boarded a flight to Geneva and then another to Bucharest.

The plot against Zeraati is part of a widening campaign by the Iranian government which involves hiring criminals—Russian mobsters, Hells Angels bikers, and even Swedish teen-agers—to attack its detractors and sow fear among Iranians in exile. Because these operations draw from the criminal underworld, the Iranian regime can deny any involvement. “Hired criminals are cheap, and they know how to blend in,” Colin Clarke, the executive director at the Soufan Center, a global-security think tank, told me. “And Iran doesn’t seem to care if these guys get caught or can’t get the job done.” Even a foiled plot can spread fear among the diaspora. “Sometimes terrorism isn’t about body counts. It’s about who is watching.”

The Iranian regime has been killing troublesome exiles since the Islamic Revolution, in 1979. Its agents have been accused of murdering dozens of people living abroad. One of the most dramatic attacks took place in Berlin in 1992, when Iranian agents gunned down a group of Kurdish opposition leaders while they were dining at a Greek restaurant. Police arrested the murder suspects. German prosecutors said that the men were sent by senior members of the Iranian regime, including the Supreme Leader. Later, an international arrest warrant was issued for Iran’s intelligence minister, Ali Fallahian.

The German prosecution ushered in a period of relative quiet. The pace of plots picked up in 2009, following nationwide protests against the regime. Authoritarian governments “fear their own people,” Ray Takeyh, an expert on Iran at the Council on Foreign Relations, told me, and that fear “becomes much more acute during periods of vulnerability.” Iran has increasingly relied on hybrid threats as it has confronted a series of of humiliations: a U.S. drone strike, in 2020, that killed Qassem Suleimani, the leader of Quds Force, I.R.G.C.’s élite special-forces-and-intelligence unit; another wave of nationwide protests in 2022; the near-destruction of Iran’s overseas proxies; and an almost uninterrupted cycle of attacks from Israel and the United States since last June.

“The more setbacks Iran experiences at home and in the region, the more attractive these fairly cost-free operations become,” Matthew Levitt, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, told me. Levitt maintains a digital map that tracks Iranian-backed plots abroad since the country’s revolution. Over the past five years, he has recorded more than two hundred—nearly double the number documented from 1979 to 2021. Many have targeted dissidents or journalists whom the regime accuses of aiding its enemies and fomenting unrest in Iran. “Unless Western governments find a real way to increase the costs, the regime will continue to get away with kidnapping, conducting surveillance, and ultimately trying to murder people on their soil,” Levitt told me.

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