美国劳动收入份额处于战后最低水平。
The labor share of income in the US is at its lowest post-war level

原始链接: https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2026/06/the-post-covid-decline-in-the-labor-share/

美国的劳动收入份额——即经济产出中作为工资支付给劳动者的部分——已降至战后以来的最低水平。继2000年代开始的持续下滑后,新冠疫情后该份额又下降了1.6个百分点。 纽约联邦储备银行的研究人员调查了这一近期下滑是新现象,还是现有趋势的延续。他们的分析得出了两个主要结论。首先,后疫情时代的劳动收入份额走势与此前经济衰退中观察到的周期性模式一致,即该份额通常在复苏阶段出现下降。其次,此次下滑主要是由行业“内部”劳动密集度的变化所驱动,而非源于经济活动在不同行业间的重新分配(例如向低薪行业转移)。 总之,新冠疫情后劳动收入份额的下降似乎并非异常现象。相反,它遵循了既有的周期性动态,并由几十年来一直影响劳动收入份额的相同行业内部力量所推动。目前几乎没有证据表明这一趋势会偏离历史规律。

纽约联储近日发布报告指出,美国劳动收入份额已降至战后最低水平,这一结论在 Hacker News 上引发了激烈讨论。尽管报告认为目前的下滑符合历次经济衰退后的历史周期性规律,但评论者们针对其背后的原因及影响提出了多种见解: * **统计指标之争**:部分评论认为该数据具有误导性,因为它忽略了雇主承担的医疗保险费用、婴儿潮一代退休等人口结构变化,以及高收入群体受税收驱动从传统的工资制转向企业主体(如 LLC 或 S-corp)的趋势。 * **结构性经济变革**:许多用户指出,工会力量衰退、全球化以及经济“金融化”产生了长期影响。另一些人则认为,由于技术进步,人类劳动的内在价值正在自然下降。 * **贫富差距**:尽管一些人将这种下降视为资本主义的自然副产品,但另一些人对财富过度集中、税收漏洞(如“借贷、持有、过世”策略)以及政府在遏制垄断行为方面缺乏政治意愿表示不满。 总而言之,此次讨论凸显了人们对于这一趋势究竟是暂时的周期性波动,还是永久性结构转变的深刻怀疑。
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原文

The labor share of income in the U.S. is currently at its lowest-ever level in the post-war period. The labor share measures the fraction of economic output paid to workers as wages and salaries. As such, it is a useful benchmark for wage growth: when the labor share falls, it means that productivity, prices, or both are growing faster than wages. After much-studied drops in the 2000s, the labor share fell sharply again after the COVID pandemic. In this post, we compare the dynamics of the labor share post-COVID to earlier periods to understand whether the recent decline represents the continuation of a trend or a new and distinct phenomenon. We find that both the cyclicality of the labor share and the contribution of reallocation to the labor share post-COVID are similar to earlier periods.

The Evolution of the Labor Share

To contextualize the post-COVID decline in the labor share, we first describe its long-run evolution, illustrated in the chart below. For much of the post-war period, the labor share was remarkably stable, hovering around 63 percent through the late 20th century. Starting in the early 2000s, however, it entered a sustained decline, with a particularly sharp drop during the global financial crisis (GFC). The labor share is a core object of interest in the academic and public debate—it measures the share of aggregate income going to workers as opposed to capital—and a large academic literature discusses the long-run forces behind this downward trend, including technological change, the rise of “superstar” firms, and increasing markups.

The Labor Share Has Declined Since the 2000s

 Line chart tracking labor share in percentage (vertical axis) from 1945 through 2025 (horizontal axis); starting in the early 2000s, labor share entered a sustained decline, with a particularly sharp drop during the global financial crisis.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Note: Shaded regions indicate U.S. recessions.

In this post, we zoom in on the post-COVID decline in the labor share. After stabilizing in the 2010s, the labor share declined again during the post-COVID period, ultimately falling 1.6 percentage points below its pre-pandemic level. The labor share now stands at an all-time low in the post-war period. Given that the labor share declined in the two most recent recessions, how does the post-COVID decline compare to earlier recessionary episodes?

Is the Post-COVID Decline Typical Across U.S. Recessions?

In the next chart, we study the path of the labor share around various recession–expansion periods, tracing its trajectory from the onset of a downturn. We then assess whether the post-COVID decline mimics the dynamics of the labor share across earlier cycles.

The Post-COVID Evolution of the Labor Share Aligns with
Pre-2000 Recessions

Line chart tracking net change in labor share by four-quarter moving average (vertical axis) against quarters since minimum unemployment (horizontal axis) for various recession-expansion periods: 2019 to present (blue), 2007 – 2019 (dark gold), 2000 – 2007(light gold), 1989-2000 (dark green), 1979 – 1989 (light green), with the onset of COVID-19 indicated with a red dot; the dynamics of the labor share at the onset of the COVID pandemic appear similar to pre-2000 recessions: the labor share increases sharply followed by a modest decline before flattening out.
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, FRED database; authors’ calculations.

Most pre-2000 periods follow a similar pattern: the labor share increases during a recession, declines through recovery, and then rises again later in the expansion. While we restrict attention to the two most recent pre-2000 recession–expansion periods (1979-1989 and 1989-2000) and omit earlier episodes for clarity, we find broadly similar dynamics across these cycles.

This behavior changes in the 2000s. Following both the dotcom recession and the GFC, the decline in the labor share during expansion is steeper than in earlier cycles. Moreover, unlike in pre-2000 episodes, the labor share does not meaningfully rebound later in the expansion.   

The dynamics of the labor share at the onset of the COVID pandemic actually appear more similar to pre-2000 recessions: the labor share increases sharply followed by a modest decline before flattening out. Judging by past recessions, we would need a longer expansion to see the labor share rise again.

Another source of difference across recession–expansion episodes is the degree of reallocation in economic activity. As businesses and households adjusted to pandemic restrictions, economic activity may have shifted substantially across sectors. This raises the question of whether these shifts contributed to the recent decline in the aggregate labor share.

Did Sectoral Reallocation Drive the Post-COVID Decline in the Labor Share?

Some industries have higher labor shares because they rely more heavily on human labor and skills. For instance, healthcare and education tend to have higher labor shares because output relies primarily on workers’ time and expertise, while manufacturing and agriculture have lower labor shares because machinery and automation play a larger role in output. If, in the post-COVID years, a larger share of output came from low labor share industries, the aggregate labor share could decline even if labor shares within industries remained constant.

To see if COVID stands out in terms of reallocation compared to earlier recessions, we construct a reallocation index, defined as the aggregate of absolute changes in sectoral output shares across periods. The chart below plots this index across the three most recent recession episodes: 1999-2004, 2007-2012, and 2019-2024. We find that although sectoral reallocation spiked at the onset of the COVID pandemic, it then moderated and stabilized at a lower level. In contrast, earlier recessions exhibited more persistent and increasing reallocation.

COVID Led To a Spike in Economic Reallocation That Quickly Subsided

Line chart tracking the authors’ reallocation index (vertical axis) for three periods: 1999-2004 (blue), 2007-2012 (red), and 2019-2024 (gold), against years since each period’s start (horizontal axis); although sectoral reallocation spiked at the onset of the COVID pandemic, it then moderated and stabilized at a lower level; in contrast, earlier recessions exhibited more persistent and increasing reallocation.
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; authors’ calculations.
Notes: The chart shows the sectoral reallocation index, which measures how much output has shifted across fourteen major sectors. For each year, the index measures the total change in sectoral shares of value added relative to the base year for that period. Higher values indicate that a larger fraction of economic activity has been redistributed across sectors, while lower values imply that changes in aggregate output primarily reflect a relatively uniform change across industries. An index value of zero means that sectoral shares are identical to the reference year.

However, the overall amount of reallocation does not by itself determine the effect on the aggregate labor share. Even modest shifts in economic activity could reduce the aggregate labor share if they move output toward industries with lower labor intensities. To evaluate this channel, we implement a standard “shift-share” decomposition of the payroll share, which measures labor income excluding nonwage compensation. We decompose the change in the aggregate payroll share into two parts: changes happening within industries (“shift”) and changes due to economic activity moving between industries (“share,” or reallocation). The chart below presents this decomposition for the same recession episodes as before.

The red bars show the total change in the aggregate payroll share between the first and last year of each period. The gold bars capture how much of that change in the payroll share was caused by shifts within industries—for instance, changes in how much retail pays workers relative to its own output. The blue bars show how much of the change is due to economic activity moving between industries—for instance, whether output shifted toward sectors that generally have higher or lower payroll shares.

Within-Industry Declines, Not Between-Industry Reallocation, Drove the Fall in the Aggregate Payroll Share

 Bar chart tracking the contribution to change in aggregate payroll share in percentage points (vertical axis) for three periods, from left to right (horizontal axis): 1999 – 2004, 2007-2012, and 2019-2024, for net change in payroll share (red), within-industry labor share changes (gold), and between-industry reallocation effects (blue); declines in the aggregate payroll share during COVID and the previous two recessions were entirely driven by changes within industries rather than shifts across industries.
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; authors’ calculations.
Notes: For each period, the change in the aggregate payroll share is decomposed into (1) a shift component, reflecting changes in within-sector payroll shares, and (2) a share component, reflecting changes in sectoral composition. The shift and share component sum to the change in the payroll share across the period.

From this shift–share decomposition, we find that declines in the aggregate payroll share during COVID, and the previous two recessions, were entirely driven by changes within industries rather than shifts across industries. Across all three recession periods, we find that movements in output across sectors contribute nothing or very little to the change in the aggregate payroll share.

Conclusion

This post documents a persistent drop in the labor share following the COVID pandemic. Is this decline a distinct change from the recent behavior of the labor share in the U.S.? Along the two key dimensions we investigate, our answer is no. First, the labor share’s trajectory post-COVID broadly follows the cyclical patterns observed in earlier recessions, with a decline during the recovery phase that mirrors historical dynamics. Second, the decline in the labor share since COVID is driven primarily by within-industry changes rather than shifts in economic activity across sectors. Taken together, these results suggest that the post-COVID decline follows the same cyclical patterns as earlier recessions and is driven by the same within-industry forces, and they provide little evidence that it will evolve differently from past episodes.

Richard Audoly is a research economist in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Research and Statistics Group.

Miles Guerin is a research analyst in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Research and Statistics Group.

Srinidhi Narayanan

Srinidhi Narayanan is a research analyst in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Research and Statistics Group.

Portrait: photo of Rachel Schuh

Rachel Schuh is a research economist in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Research and Statistics Group. 


How to cite this post:
Richard Audoly, Miles Guerin, Srinidhi Narayanan, and Rachel Schuh, “The Post‑COVID Decline in the Labor Share,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Liberty Street Economics, June 24, 2026, https://doi.org/10.59576/lse.20260624 BibTeX: View |

 
@article{AudolyGuerinNarayananSchuh2026,
    author={Audoly, Richard and Guerin, Miles and Narayanan, Srinidhi and Schuh, Rachel},
    title={The Post‑COVID Decline in the Labor Share},
    journal={Liberty Street Economics},
    note={Liberty Street Economics Blog},
    number={June 24},
    year={2026},
    url={https://doi.org/10.59576/lse.20260624}
}

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The views expressed in this post are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the author(s).

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