Authored by Andrew Korbybko via Substack,
Sanctions, bureaucracy, and logistics are the primary obstacles to “diversifying economic ties and correcting the existing imbalance”, but these can be surmounted through SMEs playing a greater role, more localization and procedure simplifications, and optimizing their trade corridors.
The Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) and Gateway House, which are among their country’s top think tanks, published a joint report in late March about moving “Toward More Balanced Russia–India Economic Relations” for the second Russia-India International Conference. It’s over 40 pages long so this piece will highlight the top takeaways and then briefly analyze them. The report began by acknowledging the challenges posed by US sanctions for reaching their goal of $100 billion in bilateral trade by 2030.
The solution that was presented, especially for the oil and financial industries, is having Indian SMEs play a much greater role due to their much less exposure (if any at all) to the US’ secondary sanctions. China’s “tea pot” model of small refineries is mentioned as an example for India’s oil industry to follow. The authors also proposed bilateral cooperation in building similar such facilities in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Kenya, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka, for example. India would thus help Russia meet their smaller demand.
Their suggestion for expanding critical minerals cooperation is for their state-owned companies to form joint R&D initiatives to strengthen their technological self-sufficiency. As for doing the same in the broad health-related field (biotech, pharmaceuticals, etc.), it’s recommended that Indian manufacturers localize production, IP rights, etc., in Russia to better overcome bureaucratic hurdles. Russian research capabilities could also pair with Indian manufacturing capacity to expand market share in third countries.
The bureaucratic hurdles mentioned above also impede cooperation on food and textile industries, but simplifying procedures could help, especially through the creation of unified digital platforms. More industrial cooperation is possible, especially in the automotive, aviation, and railway industries, but localization is likely the prerequisite. Improving logistics across the North-South Transport Corridor and the Vladivostok-Chennai Maritime Corridor can reduce costs and thus raise incentives for scaling trade.
More technological cooperation is difficult for the multiple reasons that were enumerated in the report, not least of which is global competition, so this might prove disappointing in the future. Each’s SMEs might have better chances, but overall, this might not expand associated cooperation all that much. What’s much more promising is labor cooperation, which is already a work in progress that readers can learn more about here, basically amounting to Russia replacing Central Asian labor with Indian.
To review, sanctions, bureaucracy, and logistics are the primary obstacles to “diversifying economic ties and correcting the existing imbalance”, but these can be surmounted through SMEs playing a greater role, more localization and procedure simplifications, and optimizing their trade corridors. Although the prospects for more technological cooperation are dim, efforts nevertheless shouldn’t be abandoned due to the strategic importance of this industry, especially its AI component.
The authors conclude that Russia and India’s $100 billion trade goal by 2030 is realistic, but this requires urgently implementing the aforementioned proposals to increase 2025’s estimated $60 billion in trade by another $40 billion in the next four years, which will be very difficult to achieve and then maintain. The Third Gulf War has caused radical changes to the global energy market, Eurasian logistics, and the financial industry, however, so it’s premature to predict the odds of success till the dust finally settles.