政府利用定向广告追踪你的位置。
The Government Uses Targeted Advertising to Track Your Location

原始链接: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/03/targeted-advertising-gives-your-location-government-just-ask-cbp

## 政府通过在线广告追踪:日益增长的担忧 最近的报告证实,美国政府机构,如海关与边境保护局(CBP),正在利用从在线广告行业收集的位置数据来追踪个人,而无需搜查令。该系统利用了广告技术公司为投放“相关”广告而建立的大量数据收集实践,并通过经纪人购买数据。 这种追踪的核心依赖于“实时竞价”(RTB),网站竞拍广告位,同时将用户数据(包括位置)暴露给众多公司。数据经纪人随后收集这些信息,通常在应用程序开发者不知情的情况下,并将其出售给执法部门。像ICE和CBP这样的机构已经购买了工具来分析这些数据,以识别和追踪个人。 CBP在2019-2021年的一项试点计划中承认了使用这种做法,但购买仍在继续。个人可以通过禁用移动广告ID和审查应用程序的位置权限来采取措施限制追踪。然而,持久的改变需要科技公司限制精确位置数据的使用,以及立法者制定强有力的隐私法律——包括关闭允许无搜查令数据购买的漏洞——以保护公民的第四修正案权利。这种做法凸显了不受约束的在线行为广告的危险后果。

一个黑客新闻的讨论围绕着EFF的一篇文章,该文章详细介绍了政府利用定向广告来追踪位置数据。用户表达了担忧,质疑即使关闭了位置权限,如何真正保护隐私,特别是关于蜂窝运营商收集的数据,并探讨了注重隐私的蜂窝服务选项。 一个反复出现的主题是自我强加的对智能手机的依赖——即使存在隐私风险,也无法延迟获取信息直到到达电脑。一些人建议制定强有力的隐私立法作为解决方案,而另一些人则指出依赖政治系统来解决这个问题存在局限性。 另一种观点认为,问题不是广泛的好奇心,而是智能手机提供的持续的干扰和娱乐的渴望。原始帖子强调了文章中关于这种追踪的行动呼吁。
相关文章

原文

We've all had the unsettling experience of seeing an ad online that reveals just how much advertisers know about our lives. You're right to be disturbed. Those very same online ad systems have been used by the government to warrantlessly track peoples' locations, new reporting has confirmed.

For years, the internet advertising industry has been sucking up our data, including our location data, to serve us "more relevant ads." At the same time, we know that federal law enforcement agencies have been buying up our location data from shady data brokers that most people have never heard of.

Now, a new report gives us direct evidence that Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has used location data taken from the internet advertising ecosystem to track phones. In a document uncovered by 404 Media, CBP admits what we’ve been saying for years: The technical systems powering creepy targeted ads also allow federal agencies to track your location.

The document acknowledges that a program by the agency to use "commercially available marketing location data" for surveillance drew from the process used to select the targeted ads shown to you on nearly every website and app you visit. In this blog post, we'll tell you what this process is, how it can and is being used for state surveillance, and what can be done about it—by individuals, by lawmakers, and by the tech companies that enable these abuses.

Advertising Surveillance Enables Government Surveillance

The online advertising industry has built a massive surveillance machine, and the government can co-opt it to spy on us. 

In the absence of strong privacy laws, surveillance-based advertising has become the norm online. Companies track our online and offline activity, then share it with ad tech companies and data brokers to help target ads. Law enforcement agencies take advantage of this advertising system to buy information about us that they would normally need a warrant for, like location data. They rely on the multi-billion-dollar data broker industry to buy location data harvested from people’s smartphones.

We’ve known for years that location data brokers are one part of federal law enforcement's massive surveillance arsenal, including immigration enforcement agencies like CBP and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). ICE, CBP and the FBI have purchased location data from the data broker Venntell and used it to identify immigrants who were later arrested. Last year, ICE purchased a spy tool called Webloc that gathers the locations of millions of phones and makes it easy to search for phones within specific geographic areas over a period of time. Webloc also allows them to filter location data by the unique advertising IDs that Apple and Google assign to our phones.

But a document recently obtained by 404 Media is the first time CBP has acknowledged the location data it buys is partially sourced from the system powering nearly every ad you see online: real-time bidding (RTB). As CBP puts it, “RTB-sourced location data is recorded when an advertisement is served.” 

Even though this document is about a 2019-2021 pilot use of this data, CBP and other federal agencies have continued to purchase and use commercially obtained location data. ICE has purchased location tracking tools since then and recently requested information on “Ad Tech” tools it could use for investigations. 

The CBP document acknowledges two sources of location data that it relies on: software development kits (SDKs) and RTB, both methods of location-tracking that EFF has written about before. Apps for weather, navigation, dating, fitness, and “family safety” often request location permissions to enable key features. But once an app has access to your location, it could share it with data brokers directly through SDKs or indirectly (and often without the app developers' knowledge) through RTB. Data brokers can collect location data from SDKs that they pay developers to put in their apps. When relying on RTB, data brokers don’t need any direct relationship with the apps and websites they’re collecting location data from. RTB is facilitated by ad companies that are already plugged into most websites and apps. 

How Real-Time Bidding Works

RTB is the process by which most websites and apps auction off their ad space. Unfortunately, the milliseconds-long auctions that determine which ads you see also expose your information, including location data, to thousands of companies a day. At a high-level, here’s how RTB works:

  1. The moment you visit a website or app with ad space, it asks an ad tech company to determine which ads to display for you. 
  2. This ad tech company packages all the information they can gather about you into a “bid request” and broadcasts it to thousands of potential advertisers. 
  3. The bid request may contain information like your unique advertising ID, your GPS coordinates, IP address, device details, inferred interests, demographic information, and the app or website you’re visiting. The information in bid requests is called “bidstream data” and typically includes identifiers that can be linked to real people. 
  4. Advertisers use the personal information in each bid request, along with data profiles they’ve built about you over time, to decide whether to bid on the ad space. 
  5. The highest bidder gets to display an ad for you, but advertisers (or the adtech companies that represent them) can collect your bidstream data regardless of whether or not they bid on the ad space.   

A key vulnerability of real-time bidding is that while only one advertiser wins the auction, all participants receive data about the person who would see their ad. As a result, anyone posing as an ad buyer can access a stream of sensitive data about billions of individuals a day. Data brokers have taken advantage of this vulnerability to harvest data at a staggering scale. For example, the FTC found that location data broker Mobilewalla collected data on over a billion people, with an estimated 60% sourced from RTB auctions. Leaked data from another location data broker, Gravy Analytics, referenced thousands of apps, including Microsoft apps, Candy Crush, Tinder, Grindr, MyFitnessPal, pregnancy trackers and religious-focused apps. When confronted, several of these apps’ developers said they had never heard of Gravy Analytics. 

As Venntel, one of the location data brokers that has sold to ICE, puts it, “Commercially available bidstream data from the advertising ecosystem has long been one of the most comprehensive sources of real-time location and device data available.” But the privacy harms of RTB are not just a matter of misuse by individual data brokers. RTB auctions broadcast the average person’s data to thousands of companies, hundreds of times per day, with no oversight of how this information is ultimately exploited. Once your information is broadcast through RTB, it’s almost impossible to know who receives it or control how it’s used. 

What You Can Do To Protect Yourself

Revelations about the government's exploitation of this location data shows how dangerous online tracking has become, but we’re not powerless. Here are two basic steps you can take to better protect your location data:

  1. Disable your mobile advertising ID (see instructions for iPhone/Android). Apple and Google assign unique advertising IDs to each of their phones. Location data brokers use these advertising IDs to stitch together the information they collect about you from different apps. 
  2. Review apps you’ve granted location permissions to. Apps that have access to your location could share it with other companies, so make sure you’re only granting location permission to apps that really need it in order to function. If you can’t disable location access completely for an app, limit it to only when you have the app open or only approximate location instead of precise location. 

For more tips, check out EFF’s guide to protecting yourself from mobile-device based location tracking. Keep in mind that the security plan that’s best for you will vary in different situations. For example, you may want to take stronger steps to protect your location data when traveling to a sensitive location, like a protest. 

What Tech Companies and Lawmakers Must Do

Legislators and tech companies must act so that individuals don’t bear the burden of defending their data every time they use the internet.

Ad tech companies must reckon with their role in warrantless government surveillance, among other privacy harms. The systems they built for targeted advertising are actively used to track people’s location. The best way to prevent online ads from fueling surveillance is to stop targeting ads based on detailed behavioral profiles. Ads can still be targeted contextually—based on the content people are viewing—without collecting or exposing their sensitive personal information. Short of moving to contextual advertising, tech companies can limit the use of their systems for government location tracking by:

  • Stopping the use of precise location data for targeted advertising. Ad tech companies facilitating ad auctions can and should remove precise location data from bid requests. Ads can be targeted based on people’s coarse location, like the city they’re in, without giving data brokers people’s exact GPS coordinates. Precise location data can reveal where we work, where we live, who we meet, where we protest, where we worship, and more. Broadcasting it to thousands of companies a day through RTB is dangerous.
  • Removing advertising IDs from devices, or at minimum, disabling them by default. Advertising IDs have become a linchpin of the data broker economy and are actively used by law enforcement to track people’s location. Advertising IDs were added to phones in 2012 to let companies track you, and removing them is not a far-fetched idea. When Apple forced apps to request access to people’s advertising IDs starting in 2021 (if you have an iPhone you’ve probably seen the "Ask App Not to Track" pop-ups), 96% of U.S. users opted out, essentially disabling advertising IDs on most iOS devices. One study found that iPhone users were less likely to be victims of financial fraud after Apple implemented this change. Google should follow Apple’s lead and disable advertising IDs by default.

Lawmakers also need to step up to protect their constituents' privacy. We need strong, federal privacy laws to stop companies from spying on us and selling our personal information. EFF advocates for data privacy legislation with teeth and a ban on ad targeting based on online behavioral profiles, as it creates a financial incentive for companies to track our every move.

Legislators can and must also close the "data broker loophole" on the Fourth Amendment. Instead of obtaining a warrant signed by a judge, law enforcement agencies can just buy location data from private brokers to find out where you've been. Last year, Montana became the first state in the U.S. to pass a law blocking the government from buying sensitive data it would otherwise need a warrant to obtain. And in 2024, Senator Ron Wyden's EFF-endorsed Fourth Amendment is Not for Sale Act passed the House before dying in the Senate. Others should follow suit to stop this end-run around constitutional protections.

Online behavioral advertising isn’t just creepy–it’s dangerous. It's wrong that our personal information is being silently harvested, bought by shadow-y data brokers, and sold to anyone who wants to invade our privacy. This latest revelation of warrantless government surveillance should serve as a frightening wakeup call of how dangerous online behavioral advertising  has become.

联系我们 contact @ memedata.com