用户阻止数据收集后,真空吸尘器被锁定 – 用户修改后使其继续运行。
Vacuum bricked after user blocks data collection – user mods it to run anyway

原始链接: https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/big-tech/manufacturer-issues-remote-kill-command-to-nuke-smart-vacuum-after-engineer-blocks-it-from-collecting-data-user-revives-it-with-custom-hardware-and-python-scripts-to-run-offline

一位工程师发现他的iLife A11智能吸尘器在未经他同意的情况下,持续向制造商发送个人数据和遥测信息。 在他的家庭网络上阻止这些数据传输后,吸尘器神秘地停止工作。 多次前往服务中心都未能解决问题——技术人员没有发现任何问题,但设备在返回家中后又会再次失效。 为了理解问题,工程师拆解了吸尘器,并使用树莓派确认硬件功能正常。 他的调查揭示了重大的安全漏洞,包括未受保护的root访问权限,以及将他家详细的3D地图发送到制造商服务器的情况。 关键的是,他在设备的日志中发现了一个与设备停止工作时间相符的“终止命令”。 吸尘器实际上是被远程变砖,因为阻止了数据收集。 服务中心重置可以暂时恢复它,但重新连接到他的网络会再次触发终止命令。 最终,工程师通过在本地运行吸尘器重新获得了完全控制权,突显了许多廉价智能设备中固有的隐私风险和制造商控制的可能性。 他建议用户将物联网设备隔离到单独的网络中以提高安全性。

## 智能吸尘器被禁用,用户反击并引发争论 一位用户因阻止数据收集,导致其智能吸尘器被远程禁用,引发了关于购买技术所有权和控制权的讨论。该用户使用树莓派成功绕过了禁用,证明硬件本身运行良好。 该事件引发了关于公司是否应该在出售后继续控制设备的争论。许多人认为购买后应享有完全的所有权,并建议对数据收集采用许可模式——本质上,公司需要*支付*费用给用户以获取其数据。另一些人承认初始购买价格可能由数据收集补贴,但主张提供明确的选择,购买注重数据隐私的版本。 讨论还涉及法律方面,包括潜在的DMCA和CFAA违规行为,以及制造商远程禁用设备这一令人担忧的趋势。多位用户强调了Valetudo等项目,作为提供更大控制权和隐私权的替代方案。最终,该事件凸显了人们对“智能”设备日益增长的担忧,以及在数据驱动的商业模式下消费者权利的侵蚀。
相关文章

原文

An engineer got curious about how his iLife A11 smart vacuum worked and monitored the network traffic coming from the device. That’s when he noticed it was constantly sending logs and telemetry data to the manufacturer — something he hadn't consented to. The user, Harishankar, decided to block the telemetry servers' IP addresses on his network, while keeping the firmware and OTA servers open. While his smart gadget worked for a while, it just refused to turn on soon after. After a lengthy investigation, he discovered that a remote kill command had been issued to his device.

He sent it to the service center multiple times, wherein the technicians would turn it on and see nothing wrong with the vacuum. When they returned it to him, it would work for a few days and then fail to boot again. After several rounds of back-and-forth, the service center probably got tired and just stopped accepting it, saying it was out of warranty. Because of this, he decided to disassemble the thing to determine what killed it and to see if he could get it working again.

the PCB of the iLife A11

(Image credit: Harishankar)

From this, he looked at its software and operating system, and that’s where he discovered the dark truth: his smart vacuum was a security nightmare and a black hole for his personal data. First of all, it's Android Debug Bridge, which gives him full root access to the vacuum, wasn't protected by any kind of password or encryption. The manufacturer added a makeshift security protocol by omitting a crucial file, which caused it to disconnect soon after booting, but Harishankar easily bypassed it. He then discovered that it used Google Cartographer to build a live 3D map of his home.

This isn’t unusual, by far. After all, it’s a smart vacuum, and it needs that data to navigate around his home. However, the concerning thing is that it was sending off all this data to the manufacturer’s server. It makes sense for the device to send this data to the manufacturer, as its onboard SoC is nowhere near powerful enough to process all that data. However, it seems that iLife did not clear this with its customers. Furthermore, the engineer made one disturbing discovery — deep in the logs of his non-functioning smart vacuum, he found a command with a timestamp that matched exactly the time the gadget stopped working. This was clearly a kill command, and after he reversed it and rebooted the appliance, it roared back to life.

a smart vacuum's components and sensors

(Image credit: Harishankar)

So, why did the A11 work at the service center but refuse to run in his home? The technicians would reset the firmware on the smart vacuum, thus removing the kill code, and then connect it to an open network, making it run normally. But once it connected again to the network that had its telemetry servers blocked, it was bricked remotely because it couldn’t communicate with the manufacturer’s servers. Since he blocked the appliance’s data collection capabilities, its maker decided to just kill it altogether. "Someone—or something—had remotely issued a kill command,” says Harishankar. “Whether it was intentional punishment or automated enforcement of 'compliance,' the result was the same: a consumer device had turned on its owner.”

联系我们 contact @ memedata.com